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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A
- An Overview of the Concept of Action and the
Problem of the Pariah
Hannah Arendt's political thought probes a variety of
themes that originate in ancient Greece and Rome, extend
in-o the American revolutionary period, and continue through
the contemporary 20th century era. If one can make a
generalization about her vast body of work, it is
problematic both in its suggestiveness and elusivity, and
for these reasons, provokes varied critiques. It is
difficult to categorize Arendt's work because it does not
fall easily into any school or system of thought. Arendt
did not leave behind any disciples, although her students
were influenced considerably by her thought
.[ 1 ] Critics
have been frustrated in their attempts to categorize
Arendt's work. [2] She advocates self-thinking
( selbstdenken) which she characterizes in a letter to
Gershom Scholem on the Eichmann controversy:
What confuses you is that my arguments and
my approach are different from what you are
used to; in other words, the trouble is that
I am independent. By this I mean, on the one
hand, that I do not belong to any organization
and always speak only for myself, and on the
other hand, that I have great confidence in
Lessing's selbstdenken for which, I think, no
ideology, no public opinion, and no 'convictions'
can ever be a substitute .[ 3
]
Arendt's self -thinking is what makes her thought so rigorous
and challenging. Her self-thinking, unique phenomenological
method, and generally idiosyncratic view of politics cause
her to defy classification even further. Her work examines
a number of different themes: action, totalitarianism, "the
Jewish question," revolution, violence, thinking, willing,
and judging. Exploring the possibilities and potentialities
of political action constitutes a pervasive and major thread
in her work. In The Human Condition she seeks to provide a
theoretical grounding for these possibilities. In this
study, Arendt maintains that action was not given its due in
the traditional hierarchy of western metaphysics in which
the vita contemplativa (the life of the mind) is privileged
over the vita activa (the life of action). Arendt argues
that the Platonic philosopher's withdrawal from the world is
fundamentally anti-political in its isolation from the space
of appearances.
For many critics, commentators, and students of
political theory, Hannah Arendt's most significant
contribution and the one with which they seek to come to
terms, is her account of action and the political
.
[4 ] Most
examine the role that action plays in revolution, founding,
and constitution-making in On Revolution
,
its noted absence
in totalitarian regimes, and Arendt's rigid separation of
action and politics from the social question. But the
question and problem of the pariah is found nowhere in this
critical corpus. The pariah, a concept and characterization
Arendt develops in the essay "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden
Tradition" is one that has not received much attention from
3her critics. As a significant theme and a focus of
legitimate inquiry, the pariah has been a conspicuous
omission from scholarly treatments of Arendt
' s work. [5] in
what follows, I will establish the pariah's importance in
the context of her thought and explore the possibilities for
the pariah's relationship to political action.
Arendt's exploration of the pariah, a marginal person
who does not fully "belong" anywhere leads to a central
problematic in her work. Her theory of action places
inestimable importance on acting in the world, the public
space. For Arendt, acting and speaking among others in the
realm of appearances affirms our common humanity and assures
the emergence of unique identity. In her terms, acting
politically preserves the specifically human character of
the world, its diversity and artifacts. Thus given Arendt's
account of action, how do pariahs who occupy positions
outside the world, estranged from it, ever become viable
actors? Restated: can the pariah overcome estrangement and
become a political actor/participant in the public realm,
while also maintaining a unique collective identity? I will
examine whether the pariah's collective identity as
elaborated by Arendt, meshes with the characteristics of her
citizen/actor in order to determine whether pariahs can
"act" in an Arendtian sense. My question, then, is: what is
the relationship between the pariah and action?
The problem of the pariah manifests itself within the
context of Arendt's concern for action and worldliness.
4This concern requires that human beings belong to, and
become situated in the world. The problem of the pariah, or
the political outsider, raises particular concerns for
Arendt's theory of action which privileges caring for the
world by acting in the public realm. In Arendt's thought
the pariah is a political outcast who has no access to the
public space, the arena that encourages the expression and
affirmation of individual and group identities. For Arendt,
the public space is the all-important life-affirming,
preserver of humanity.
In this study, I will demonstrate how the concept of
the pariah informs Arendt's theory of political action and
will determine which of its elements contribute to the
relationship of the two. Speech, language itself, provides
the most significant conceptual link between the pariah and
political action. The challenge is to elucidate what might
constitute the pariah's action and how these qualities might
be transferred into the public realm. Without access to the
public space, the pariah, an individual without political or
social status, becomes a contradiction to Arendt's theory.
In a sense, Arendt offers her own antidote to the problem of
the pariah in her belief that no individual can live and
achieve a truly human identity without belonging to some
political community. It is precisely for this reason that I
will argue that we must view Arendt's theory of political
action in terms of the pariah.
5Arendt s work on the pariah and other Jewish themes
,
leads up to her consideration of action and plays an
important role in formulating her theory. Her insistence on
viewing issues such as the Jewish question in political,
rather than social or assimilationist terms, underscores it
as an essential component in her theory of action.
B . Who is the Pariah?
In "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition" Arendt
distinguishes between the conscious pariahs, or the Jews who
were aware of their marginal status both in Jewish society
and in relation to European culture, and the parvenus who at
best, are accepted only as exceptions. Ron Feldman
characterizes the situation of the conscious pariah in the
following way:
By affirming both their Jewish particularity
and their right to a place in general European
life, the conscious pariahs became marginal
not only in relation to European society --
as all Jews were -- but to the Jewish community
as well
.
[ 6
]
Arendt probes the lives and works of several conscious
pariahs: Bernard Lazare, Heinrich Heine, Franz Kafka, Rosa
Luxemburg, Rahel Varnhagen, and Isak Dinesen among several
others. Arendt ' s pariahs are primarily literary, cultural,
intellectual, and political figures whose gifts and
achievements she recognizes as enduring, and whose projects
are enriched by the consciousness and wisdom that is the
gift of a marginalized existence. The women pariahs
Arendt describes illuminate not only what it means to
straddle two worlds at once, but several. They inhabit the
world of the pariah, confront the dominant culture, and
belong to a milieu of intellectual women which because of
its small size, results in an even more peripheral and
marginalized status than their less intellectually oriented
counterparts. The women pariahs hover on the periphery
attempting to gain foothold inside the public realm, but
they mostly live outside of it, circulating within the
private sphere. Arendt 's portrait of Rosa Luxemburg proves
to be an exception to this rule however. Gaining status and
legitimacy are hard enough for the male pariah, let alone
the female pariah's struggle for recognition. Arendt 's
analysis of two women pariahs, Rahel Varnhagen and Rosa
Luxemburg, reveals the complications of the pariah's
dilemma. It also becomes an illumination, and in part, a
reflection on her own pariah status as a German-Jewish woman
intellectual and refugee living in the particularly volatile
times of World War II Europe.
As stated earlier, of the several book length studies
on Arendt 's political thought, none confront the role of the
pariah and thus, do not attempt to situate the concept in
the context of her work. Current scholarship fails to give
any serious attention to the concept of the pariah. But
when it does address the issue, it only takes it into
account as part of Arendt ' s Jewish writings, failing to
7confront the concept's subtleties and potential significance
to the theory of action. Critics fail to see Arendt's
theory of political action, individuals appearing before one
another as equals in the public realm with words and deeds,
as inextricably linked with her elaboration on the
experience of Jewishness in the modern age. The history of
post-Emancipation Jews' exclusion from European society,
their marginality, and inability to become full and equal
participants in the public realm, significantly informs
Arendt's vision of the political. Arendt is highly critical
of the long history of Jewish exclusion and estrangement
from the political realm and argues, moreover, that Jews
must assume a share of caring for the world. The pariah
must, she maintains, establish and claim political and legal
identities in order to share a stake in the world. Arendt
vehemently opposes social solutions to the Jewish question
that at best, foster only an assimilationist
,
parvenu
mentality — a cosmetic change. Her analysis suggests that
the pariah can have access to the public realm and find a
home in the world with an awakening of consciousness.
1 . Public v. Private, Political v. Social
Arendt's view of the Jewish question as inherently
political stems from her strict separation of the public
from the private realm, and the political from the social.
This profound distinction turns on the Greek notion of
freedom v. necessity: freedom sets the stage for politics,
acting and speaking among one's equals in the space of
3appearances. The private realm corresponds with necessity
comprised of emotions, as well as activities of
production and consumption, all of which are fundamentally
anti-political
.
Arendt's public sphere is comprised of freedom, action,
speech, and memory; it is a privileged realm for citizen-
actors to come together to talk about things that cannot be
figured out with certainty. This brings into focus the
crucial distinction Arendt draws between the political and
the social. For Arendt, matters of distributive justice and
socio-economic equality are not the stuff of politics, but
belong to a social or administrative sphere. Because social
welfare issues have to do with producing and consuming, or
the realm of necessity, they are fundamentally anti-
political, and are therefore, not within the purview of
Arendt's higher order politics.
Arendt's politics includes theorizing, storytelling,
narrativity, recovery, and remembrance, all of which
illuminate experience, its meaning, and political identity.
Leon Botstein comments that Arendt's notion of politics
would require the very skills which had
flourished among Jews in their pariah experience,
namely, thinking and speaking. A political
renaissance for modernity which utilized
the traditions of the Jewish pariah became
Arendt's normative objective for collective
life in the modern world. If political
action could be centered on the use of
language, then the once pariah European Jew
could emerge as an exemplar of political
participation
.
[7 ]
9BotSL-ein argues that Arendt's views on speech as political
action were formulated through her exploration of "the
Jewish question" and her attempt to find a way out of
ional Jewish impotence and exclusion. He asserts that
The European history of the Jewish pariah, the legacy of a
people without a home or politics, became in Arendt
political action in the ideal: the Jewish experience
generalized.
" [8 ] Arendt’s search for the inclusion of the
pariah in political life and her attempts to preserve the
unique character of European secular Jewry have an affinity
with current contemporary political realities in Eastern and
Central Europe. The pariah as the political outsider is
related to the dissident. Both are in need of access to the
public space; both lack status and a sense of legitimacy and
are potential contributors to the enrichment of politics.
Currently in Eastern and Central Europe, the pariah as
dissident is in the forefront of the political scene and has
risen to the leadership ranks. As political actors who are
now free to act and openly in the public space, these former
political outcasts exemplify the spirit of the conscious
pariah Arendt privileges.
2 . The Pariah’s Stance and Experience
In her essay "From The Pariah's Point Of View:
Reflections On Hannah Arendt's Life And Work," Elisabeth
Young-Bruehl provides further insight into Arendt's
perspective on the pariah. She states:
10
The pariah's task, in Arendt’s understanding, wasto be alert to the unexpected, to look at how
things and events appear without preconceptions
about history's course or pattern, to avoid
sacrificing the outsider's perspective for the
parvenu's comforts. [9]
Pariahs' independent stances provide them with a fresh,
critical perspective enabling them to respond to situations
as they arise. The pariah's response possesses a kind of
distance and detachment, but it also has an ethical
embeddedness that emerges from a history of social and
political exclusion. This independent stance amounts to
pariahs living as rebels among their own people and the rest
of society. In what follows, I will explore how such a
stance might compel the pariah to act politically, in an
Arendtian fashion.
Arendt ' s own experience as a refugee during the inter-
war years, a person whose legal, political, and social
identities were confused for a time, taught her that the
chances for freedom, no matter how slim and precarious must
be pursued. [10] The elements of spontaneity and
precariousness which characterize Arendtian action are such
that one never knows which way things might go, but Arendt 's
analysis suggests that the risks inherent in action are
worth it. For Arendt, the alternative to action, is a
bleak, stasized mass society.
The qualities of the pariah as thinker, speaker,
independent critic, and judge have something in common with
those Arendt sees in action. For Arendt, action is
11
conditional, tentative, contingent, and spontaneous. Where
the conditions for action flourish, human beings can
participate in, and experience the creation of new
beginnings. The opportunity to build freedom exists in a
world in which the possibilities for political action are
cultivated and preserved.
If the creation of freedom is an essential goal of
political action, it is also one of the unique qualities of
the pariah. The pariah is free from the pull of specific
interests, factions, or parties, from biases, ideologies,
and other keenly held passions. The pariah responds
uniquely to each new situation and takes the risk of
independent thought unhampered by conventions, tending to
offer radical assessments of political matters. The
challenge lies in whether the pariah can channel these
characteristics into the public realm to help establish a
political identity and a basis for public freedom.
Arendt's concept of the political seeks to allow
individuals the space to appear as who they are in all their
particularity. Similarly, she advances the idea that the
Jew as pariah should appear as the representative of the
pariah in the public realm without renouncing the collective
pariah identity. The conscious pariah is her example of the
way in which Jews might participate in political life. As I
stated earlier, Arendt remains extremely critical of Jews'
assimilationist tendencies and efforts to hide or change
their identities. The pariah must assume a share of
12
responsibility tor sustaining the world, and this can only
be achieved by joining the public realm. The potentiality
inherent in Arendt 1 s characterization of action and
natality, the prospect of creating something heretofore
unseen, reflects her sense of hope for the future of the
public realm.
a - The Pariah’s Potential for Action . As previously
stated, the central paradox of the pariah lies in the fact
that such an individual does not fully belong anywhere and
occupies a position outside of the world. This outsider
status runs counter to the significance Arendt places on
being situated "in" the world, of not being estranged from
it, and the importance of acting in a plurality. She is
concerned with amor mundi, or love of the world, and seeks
to enrich the possibilities for authentic political action.
Free and unburdened by care for the world, it would seem
that on the surface, the pariah would not be the kind of
political actor Arendt envisions. I will work through this
problem to determine whether the pariah can be "in" the
world in an Arendtian sense.
Chapter Two attempts to offer a critical interpretation
of Arendt 's theory of action and will explore her
characterization of the political. Chapter Three focuses on
the concept of the pariah -- how it emerges in the context
of her thought and whether its characteristics fulfill the
requirements of action as elaborated by Arendt. The study
will conclude with some thoughts on the potential for a
13
relationship between action and the pariah. I will also
offer some tentative reflections on the concept of the
pariah s significance to the unfolding contemporary
political realities in Eastern and Central Europe.
Given the momentous changes that have occurred in this
part of the world and the resulting dramatic shifting of
political configurations, it seems especially fitting to
rediscover and reflect on Hannah Arendt's work. I think
that Arendt would have reveled in these revolutionary times
of founding, with the toppling of Communist parties and
regimes and the growth of non-violent peoples' movements.
She had great hope for the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and
the reformist mood of the 1968 Prague Spring. If she were
alive today, she would have applauded the courageousness of
the people involved in the current efforts to break the
Communist Party's monopoly on power. Arendt would have
regarded the daily spectacle of people demonstrating for
political and economic reforms as an act of liberation, a
breaking with the old to usher in a revolution that would
establish the framework for a founding. That members of the
opposition and leading dissidents are leading new coalition
governments, points to the potential significance of the
pariah for invigorating and sustaining a viable public
space. For Arendt, people claiming public power, a public
space, and holding spontaneous demonstrations, constitutes
political action and functions to preserve the revolutionary
spirit in everyday life. Arendt encapsulates this spirit as
14
"the eagerness to liberate and to build a new house where
freedom can dwell. "[11]
It is my belief that a study of Arendt 1 s concept of the
pariah understood in relation to her theory of action is
deepened when considered against the background of recent
political events. Today the fruits of action and the
unexpected are culled in places we might never have dreamed
were possible. It is, then, my good fortune to have
rediscovered Arendt' s thought during a period of revolution
and new beginnings
.
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Notes
1. Lewis Coser remarks:
Arendt left no disciples, though political theorists
such as Sheldon Wolin, George Kateb, and John Schaarhave testified to the impact of her thought on their
own. She did not wish to found a 'school' or a sect,but she intended to reopen the dialogue, inside and
outside the academy.
Lewis Coser, Refugee Scholars In America - Their impart
and Their Experiences
, (New Haven and London- vaio
University Press, 1984), p. 196.
Elizabeth Minnich in "Hannah Arendt: Thinking As We Are"
also attests to Arendt 's profound influence on her work.
Between Women
,
ed. Carol Ascher, Louise DeSalvo, and Sara
Ruddick, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), pp. 171-85.
2. In response to a question about how she defines herself
politically, Arendt states:
I don't really know. I really don't know and I've
never known... You know the left think that I am
conservative, and the conservatives sometimes think
that I am left or I am a maverick, or God knows what.
And I must say I couldn't care less. I don't think
that the real questions of this century will get any
kind of illumination by this kind of thing.
She also states: "So you ask me where I am. I am
nowhere. I am really not in the mainstream of present or
any other political thought. But not because I want to
be so original--it so happens that I somehow don't fit."
"Hannah Arendt: On Hannah Arendt," in Hannah Arendt:
The Recovery Of The Public World
,
ed. Melvyn A. Hill (New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 333-36.
3. Hannah Arendt, "'Eichmann in Jerusalem' - An Exchange of
Letters between Gershom Scholem and Hannah Arendt," in
The Jew As Pariah
,
ed. by Ron H. Feldman (New York: Grove
Press, Inc., 1978), p. 250.
4. Among the most significant book length studies which
address Arendt 's concept of political action in her
political theory are: Stephen J. Whitfield, Into the Dark:
Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism
,
(Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1980); Margaret Canovan, The Political
Thought of Hannah Arendt, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd.,
1974); George Kateb, Hannah Arendt - Politics, Conscience,
Evil
,
(Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983); and
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Bhikhu Parekh, Hannah Arendt and the Search for a NewPolitical Philosophy
,
(Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey-Humanities Press, 1981).
Also significant to the steadily increasing body ofliterature on her work is a special issue of Social Research44 (Spring 1977 ) which was devoted entirely to Arendt
shortly after her death, and several essays in Salmagundi 60(Spring-Summer 1983).
A symposium called "Arendt, Politics, And The Self
appears in Political Theory 16 (February 1988): 77-98. Each
of the three commentators examines pertinent aspects of
Arendt' s later work in the Life of the Mind series. Sevla
Benhabib on "Judgment And The Moral Foundations of Politics
In Arendt' s Thought," Suzanne Jacobitti offers "Hannah
Arendt And The Will," and B. Honig on "Arendt, Identity, And
Difference." These essays confront Arendt 's investigations
into the activity of thinking and develop her concept ofjudgment as a moral faculty. They also examine the role of
the will in engendering possibilities for action and
consider it in relation to the potential suggested by the
Arendtian self. More specifically, these works debate the
constituent elements of this self and the potential for its
exercising action.
5. The only treatments of Arendt ' s development of the
pariah that I am aware of are by Ron Feldman in his
introduction to The Jew As Pariah
,
"The Jew as Pariah: The
Case of Hannah Arendt," pp . 15-52, Leon Botstein in
"Liberating The Pariah: Politics, The Jews, and Hannah
Arendt," Salmagundi 60 (Spring-Summer 1983), pp. 73-105, and
in Elisabeth Young-Bruehl ' s mammoth biography of Arendt
entitled, Hannah Arendt: For Love of the World (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1982).
6. Feldman, "The Jew as Pariah: The Case of Hannah Arendt,"
p. 18.
7. Botstein, "Liberating The Pariah," p. 79.
8. Botstein, "Liberating The Pariah," p. 95.
9. Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, "From The Pariah's Point Of
View: Reflections On Hannah Arendt's Life And Work," in
Hannah Arendt: The Recovery Of The Public World
,
ed. Melvyn
A. Hill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979), p. 4
10. Several of Arendt's commentators have stated that Arendt
may be viewed as a conscious pariah, or the politically
conscious Jew that she privileges over the parvenu. I will
not establish Arendt as a conscious pariah or substantiate
such claims, but rather, I intend to explore how the concept
of the pariah itself, as it is elaborated by Arendt, is
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signifi c ant to her theory of political action; how thequalities inherent in the pariah may create a model of
action.
Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, Ron Feldman, Elizabeth Minnich
and Lewis Coser all characterize Arendt as a consciouspariah, examining the intersection of her life and herpolitical theory. The authors point out that Arendt was
even a pariah among her own people with regard to the
Eichmann controversy and the on-going debate over the state
of Israel and Zionism. Feldman argues in his introduction
t0 The Jew As Pariah that Arendt saw herself as a consciouspariah and that this dynamic guided her approach to the
Jewish question and her work on political action. He
states
:
Arendt' s solution to her own 'Jewish problem' was
not to repudiate her Jewishness nor blindly affirm
it, but to adopt the stance of a conscious pariah
an outsider among non- Jews, and a rebel among
her own people, it was because of this marginal
position that she was able to gain critical insights
into both the Jewish and non- Jewish worlds.
Feldman sees a dialectical tension between Arendt's
understanding of modern Jewish history and her Jewish
identity which she never renounces, and her sense of
cultural and historical location in a German/European
heritage which gives her a unique theoretical vantage point
Feldman, "The Jew as Pariah: The Case of Hannah Arendt," pp
19 and 47.
11. Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, (New York: Pelican Books,
1977), p. 35.
CHAPTER II
ACTION ARENDTIAN STYLE
A. The Elements of Action
Freedom... is not only one among the manyproblems and phenomena of the political
realm properly speaking, such as justice, orpower, or equality; freedom, which only
seldom— in times of crisis or revolution--
becomes the direct aim of political action,
is actually the reason that men live together
in political organization at all. without
it, political life as such would be meaningless.
The raison d'etre of politics is freedom, and
its field of experience is action. [1]
Most of Hannah Arendt's work hinges on the importance
she attributes to political action. Her theory of action
can be considered the centerpiece of her contribution to
political theory. In The Human Condition Arendt addressess
what she views as a profound need to examine the components
of action, the distinctions between them, and their
preversions in the modern age. In order to establish the
role of the pariah in her thought, which is the focus of my
study, it is first necessary to confront Arendt's account of
action and politics. This account will illuminate what is
considered a major focus in her thought, and will provide an
idea of what the pariah's potential is for becoming a
political actor.
In The Human Condition
,
Arendt illuminates the key
components and activities that define the human condition:
labor, work, and action. Labor, says Arendt, is associated
with the biological process, and mere survival, thus, with
19
itself.’ [2] in contrast, work relates to the unnaturalness
of human existence and consists of artifice and contributing
to the world of objects and things: "The human condition of
worx is worldliness ."[ 3 ] Action, to which she attributes
tne most potential and significance, occurs directly between
individuals with no intermediaries and corresponds to the
human condition of plurality. While all three activities
are related to politics, plurality is the defining
characteristic of all political life for Arendt. Politics,
speaking and acting among others, seeing and being seen,
depends on the condition of plurality: "doing" politics
takes more than one person. Thus action and plurality are
partners -- action requires plurality as Arendt states:
Action. .. corresponds to the human condition of
plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the
earth and inhabit the world... this condition of
plurality is specifically the condition ... of ail
political life
.
[ 4
]
Together, the triptych of labor, work, and action,
relate to natality and mortality: the continuum of the human
condition. While labor is crucial for guaranteeing
individual and species survival, and work provides a
permanence to human artifacts which outlast human life,
action, the most celebrated of the three by Arendt, binds us
to political life, "in so far as it engages in founding and
preserving political bodies [and] creates the condition for
remembrance, that is, for history. "[5] But all three,
(labor, work, and action) are rooted in the concept of
20
natality which is life-affirming and continuous, "in so far
as they have the task to provide and preserve the world for,
to foresee and reckon with, the constant influx of newcomers
who are born into the world as strangers ."[ 6 ] of the
three, however, Arendt says that action has the strongest
connection to the human condition of natality:
...the new beginning inherent in birth can make
itself felt in the world only because the newcomer
possesses the capacity of beginning something anew,
that is, of acting. in this sense of initiative,
an element of action, and therefore of natality/
is inherent in all human activities
.[ 7
]
Thus, just as action is her quintessential political
activity and category, natality becomes the fertile ground
on which Arendt ' s political thought rests. Natality is the
well-spring of action because just by virtue of being born,
each individual has the capacity and the potential to
initiate something new, unprecedented, and political.
According to Arendt, all new action has the potential to be
political. By nature, action is a political, and therefore
public disclosure of identity in the presence of others.
Action, perpetually inspired by natality, is the main
category in Arendt ' s politics.
While action is rooted in natality, Arendt asserts that
mortality and the preoccupation with eternity are the
central features of traditional philosophical thought.
Arendt claims that the vita activa, a life devoted to the
public realm, has suffered from an inferior status
throughout the ages since it has been seen from the
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perspective of the vita contemplativa
,
the life devoted to
contemplating beauty and eternity. The split between
traditional philosophical thought and politics originates in
Plato, but Arendt traces the distinction specifically to
Aristotle who conceived of bioi (life) as freedom from the
necessities of life. Aristotle understood freedom as
independence from the work of keeping oneself alive.
Therefore, the slave's labor and the craftsman's
acquisitiveness did not permit them to enjoy bioi. Labor
and work produced the necessary and the useful, thus they
were deemed unfree activities. For Aristotle, life
consisted of any of the following three things: enjoyment of
the beautiful and of bodily pleasures, a life devoted to the
polis and beautiful deeds, and the life of the philosopher
who contemplates the eternal. Thus, in Aristotle we see the
seeds sown for the emergence of the vita contemplativa
'
s
superiority. Arendt notes that with the disintegration of
the Roman Empire and the rise of Christianity, the vita
activa was set back further.
Arendt views most of political philosophy since Plato
as the justification for "an escape from politics
altogether ."[ 8 ] The escape, she says, is based on the
belief that a political community can be maintained only if
some people rule and others are ruled and obey. The notion
of ruling and being ruled is based on the master/slave
relationship which Arendt believes precludes any possibility
of action. For Arendt, such a concept of rulership fueled
the "suspicion of action... and arose from the earnest desire
to find a substitute for action rather than from any
irresponsible or tyrannical will to power. "[9] Plato
substituted rulership for action and since Platonic times,
"making" and fabrication have been substituted for action,
thereby degrading action as an instrumentalizing process and
"politics as a means for something else." [10] In addition,
Arendt is critical of Plato's abolition of the private
character of the household which is class-specific, applying
only to the Guardians. While the Guardian class has no
traditional family life or private property, the other
classes maintain the "amenities" of the private realm.
Arendt believes that Plato's communalization of property
results in a dangerous encroachment into the public realm,
which she clearly privileges. The entry of the private, or
the social into the public constitutes, for Arendt, a
serious threat to the possibility of a viable politics.
Arendt is equally as adamant about the Platonic elimination
of private property, which she regards as an extension of
the family into one so-called "household." This phenomenon
leads to the creation of society, which she says, results in
a nation of households. And for Arendt, the household is
tied to necessity and to mere survival.
Ey the Middle Ages, Arendt claims that the vita
contemplativa ' s status as the only truly free way of life
was securely established; to be free from politics meant to
be free from the necessities of life. Arendt contends that
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the vita activa's inferiority is inferred from its Greek
derivation, askholia, meaning "unquiet." in contrast,
philosophy's experience of the eternal induces a kind of
speechlessness and quiet. The Platonic view of
contemplation's superiority stems from the belief that the
realm of human affairs is uncertain and unreliable and that
nothing humanly made "can equal in beauty and truth the
physical kosmos, which swings in itself in changeless
eternity without any interference or assistance from
outside ..." [11 ] Arendt brings this philosophical aversion
to the frailty of human affairs to our attention in her
criticism of the hierarchy at work in the western
philosophical tradition.
The vita activa involves introducing a standard of
permanence and a potential for immortality into human
affairs. This standard lies in the belief that mortals'
greatness is grounded in their ability to produce great
deeds, words, and things which transcend and endure through
history and story-telling. Arendt understands action as
stories about deeds recorded for remembrance. As Arendt
relates, the striving for immortality by mere mortals in
ancient times "had been the spring and center of the vita
activa. "[12] Such events and artifacts of human history as
revolution and founding occur in the sphere of action in a
plurality rather than in isolation and withdrawal from
others. The most important requirement of action is
plurality and as Arendt asserts persistently throughout her
writing, the world consists not of one, but of many, "...the
reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of
others .
"
[ 13 ]
B • The Requirements of Action
Arendt s characterization of action emanates from her
admiration and understanding of the Greek polis. In
Arendt s view, the polis provided a space where individuals
could disclose their unique identities through speech and
deeds, and strive for immortal fame. While the polis was a
forum for the contest of words and works, it also provided a
mechanism for their remembrance, thereby enabling them to
become truly immortal. Arendt asserts that the poet Homer
and the historian Thucydides did not achieve the task of
immortalization themselves, but rather the polis itself,
"seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities,
action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral
of man-made 'products,' the deeds and stories which are
their outcome, would become imperishable ."[ 14 ] As abstract
as it sounds the polis, an organization of human beings,
ensures that the space of appearances will not only secure
future possibilities for action, but the means for their
remembrance as well. The polis, says Arendt, "is a kind of
organized remembrance ."[ 15 ] For Arendt, politics emerges
directly from acting and speaking in the public realm.
Action becomes a constitutive element of this realm which is
rendered authentic in a plurality, which is the mutuality of
seeing and being seen.
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What, then are the attributes and requirements of
action? Action takes place between individuals in the
public realm who are characterized by their equality and
distinction. Speech and action are revelatory and disclose
who individuals are in all their unique specificity, while
also signaling a new beginning. Arendt says, "This
revelatory quality of speech and action comes to the fore
where people are with others and neither for nor against
them -- that is, in sheer human togetherness ."[ 16 ] For
Arendt, the actor is an agent, a disclosing "who" rather
than a "what" (an assemblage of personality traits and
characteristics), and seeks to reveal his identity in deed
and word. Arendt says, "Action without a name, a 'who'
attached to it, is meaningless ..."[ 17 ] The actor possesses
an extraordinary amount of courage because the outcome of
action, by its very nature, is uncertain and unpredictable.
Because of its inherent unpredictability, action could just
as likely produce a bad regime as a good one. The prospects
for a good regime depend on an honorable "founding" and a
commitment on the part of all to secure the conditions for
the future possibilities of action.
For Arendt, action involves striving for the
immortality and permanence of words, deeds, and stories.
Her action is agonistic and individualistic, reminiscent of
the politics found in the Athenian polis. Like the kind of
politics that flourished briefly, but spectacularly in the
polis, Arendt ' s political action is constituted by words and
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deeds which are immortalized through stories and
remembrance. The "story" of action is preserved and
"reveals itself fully only to the storyteller, that is, to
the backward glance of the historian, who indeed always
knows better what it was all about than the
ic ipant s .
"
[ 1 8 ] Actors act in the presence of their
peers and strive to distinguish themselves from each other
in their excellent words and deeds. George Kateb asserts
that for Arendt,
The aim of politics is to perpetuate itself,
to immortalize itself -- not only in the sense
that individuals aspire to say and do imperishable
things, but in the enfolding sense that all who
act act for the sake of preserving future possi-
bilities for action. The common interest is the
preservation of the frame of action, a
constitution. [19]
Thus for Arendt, politics is the quintessential worldly and
immortalizing act. The decision to act in the world
creates the potential space for freedom and the
possibilities for future actions.
To act politically is to take an initiative and to
begin something that might be larger than oneself. In "On
Violence," an essay in Crises Of The Republic
,
Arendt
asserts that human beings are political beings by virtue of
action which also makes them more fully human. In
describing action she says.
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.
. . to act is the human answer to the condition
of natality. Since we all come into the worldby virtue of birth, as newcomers and beginnings,
we are able to start something new; without the'
fact of birth we would not even know what novelty
is, all 'action' would be either mere behavior
or preservation
.[ 20
]
Natality is the underlying force of the initiative or
impetus in action; each newcomer and each individual
possesses the capacity to begin something new, original, and
unprecedented. Arendt characterizes natality as a miracle
of faith and hope in its spontaneous beginnings and it is,
she says, the condition in which "action is ontologically
rooted. "[21] Natality can be seen as the one constant and
continuous element in an otherwise uncertain world of human
affairs. It is the source of new life, and hence, of
action. Arendt ' s elaboration on natality expresses her
faith in the world of human appearances, in the public realm
-- in its health and growth through action. The capacity to
establish the world anew and the spark of novelty, closely
relates to the sentiment Arendt mentions frequently to
demonstrate her feeling of responsibility for the world.
Amor mundi, or love of the world, refers to the feeling of
being at home in the world and belonging to it. For Arendt,
care for the world is of inestimable importance, and
anything less becomes a repudiation of the human condition
itself
.
Speech and action allow the revelation of individuals'
unique distinctness; they confirm the variousness of human
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beings. Arendt contends that human life without speech and
action, and when it is not lived among others, ceases to
exist. in the public realm, individuals' words and deeds
are revealed to one another, thusly they disclose their
identities. in this context, individuals create
stories of action that can be recorded for remembrance and
for future actors. It is important to understand that for
Arendt, language itself constitutes action because it
distinguishes human beings from the rest of animal life.
In addition to speech, unexpectedness and boundlessness
are also distinctive features of action. Arendt asserts
that spontaneity "is inherent in all beginnings and in all
origins ."[ 22 ] Action is boundless in the sense that it has
no limitations, impacting on all individuals who are capable
of initiating their own actions. This "reaction" to action
is actually the instigation of a new action; thus, action
begets other newly instigated actions to establish a
constant circulation. There are also elements of
unpredictability and irreversibility in action; it cannot be
foretold or undone. Action, then, is open-ended and "fixed"
at the same time.
Arendt introduces two concepts to counter the
potentially damaging effects of action's irreversibility and
unpredictability. She proposes the faculties of forgiving
to rescue action from the dilemma of irreversibility, and
promising, as a remedy for unpredictability. Where
forgiving entails ". . .being able to undo what one has done
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though one did not, and could not, have known what he was
doing...," promising, is a remedy for the "chaotic
uncertainty of the future ..."[ 23 ] Both faculties correspond
inherently to action insofar as they require the condition
of plurality because
.
. .no one can forgive himself and no one can feel boundby a promise made only to himself; forgiving and
promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain
without reality... no more than a role played before
one ' s self
.
[24 ]
Arendt views these faculties as safeguards against the
excesses of action and believes that without them, human
beings have little to rely on and little recourse. But, she
says, not knowing future outcomes and being unable to
control events is the price paid for freedom, plurality, and
reality itself.
While Arendt acknowledges the potential dangers
inherent in action and plurality, she sings its praises as
the key to sustaining political life:
The calamities of action all arise from the
human condition of plurality, which is the
condition sine qua non for that space of
appearance which is the public realm. Hence
the attempt to do away with this plurality is always
tantamount to the abolition of the public realm
itself
.
[ 25 ]
It is clear that the uncertainty of action is not Arendt '
s
main concern, but the elimination of plurality and the
public space which joins people is. The reality of the
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world is underscored by the plurality of the public space.
This worldly space also requires interstices between people
which separate them from each other, and without which, no
human life -- no political life -- is possible. For Arendt,
this "in-between" space prevents the tendency toward
f o i t
^
and tne creation of mass society, while also
preserving the uniqueness and diversity of individuals.
1 . The Conundrum and Ambiguity of Action
Arendt ' s theory of action has provoked varied responses
among her readers and critics. Bernstein, Tlaba, and Parekh
find her theory overly abstract and abstruse, her standards
of greatness troublesome, and her sharp division between the
political and the social both unreflective of, and
inappropriate to contemporary political realities. These
critics find her political categories rigid, but at the same
time, strangely arbitrary; her concepts superficially
attractive in their open-endedness, yet flat in terms of her
failure to elaborate on the internal connections within
them. Arendt ’ s phenomenological approach to her political
catalogue is a novel, yet idiosyncratic one, and many are
quick to point out that ambiguities abound in her thought.
It is plausible to advance the notion that ambiguity is
embedded in her theory. Bhikhu Parekh puts it succinctly
when he says, "Action is one of the most important
categories in Arendt's political philosophy, yet the least
clearly def ined. " [ 26
]
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Her concept of action is nebulous; her quest for the
political is elusive. For example, George Kateb finds a
certain vagueness with regard to Arendt's thoughts on the
content of political action, asserting that she defies the
specificity that most readers want to impose on her. To
illustrate this and the extent to which ambiguity is
embedded within Arendt's concept of action, Kateb draws an
analogy between competitive games and political action:
"...a game can be completely intelligible — as political
action can never be — and totally free of human nature,
free of motives, hidden or obvious, while political action
must fight free of human nature. "[27] In other words, the
rules of a game are (usually) known to all who play, but
action is its own end representing infinite and transcendent
possibilities. But Kateb ' s main concern with Arendt's
action is that it appears to be separated from moral
motivation; it does not exist to be morally just or
correct. [28] Political action, then, is not about justice:
"The supreme achievement of political action is existential,
and the stakes are seemingly higher than the moral
ones. "[29] To counter such concerns and the risks inherent
in action, Arendt offers the faculties of forgiving and
promising, moral precepts which emerge directly from the
will to act. This does not satisfy Kateb however, who
claims that her version of keeping promises overlooks the
nature and content of the commitments made. Additionally,
he claims that her standard of forgiveness fails to
understand that a group is not responsible for forgiving,
only the person to whom wrong was done can forgive the
wrongdoer. Kateb believes that Arendt's built-in remedies
are inadequate and in referring to the Eichmann case states,
Promise-keeping cannot form a barrier to atrocity.
Eichmann kept faith with his leader. Who can forgive
what he and his superiors did? Arendt herself
cannot... she says so powerfully at the end of Eichmann
in Jerusalem
. [30 ]
As if to oppose herself and to agree with Kateb, Arendt
addresses this by responding that acts of ’’radical evil”
cannot be punished or forgiven because they occur outside
the realm of human affairs and potentialities, which they
tend to crush. Unfortunately, her responses to this dilemma
are insufficient to the criticisms and remain undeveloped.
If acts of radical evil cannot be punished or forgiven
because they are so antithetical to action, how are they
handled? There seems to be no satisfactory response to deal
with misguided, twisted action.
Richard Bernstein's comments illustrate further the
ambiguity that is part and parcel of Arendtian political
action. He asserts that if we are seeking to use Arendt's
theory as a guide to predict the future, we best look
elsewhere because it is not in the nature of political
action to offer guideposts for behavior. Bernstein writes:
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We are never in a position — before the fact --
to know whether the virtues of political action
or its terrible vices will be manifested. This
systematic ambiguity lies at the very core ofHannah Arendt's metaphysics of action; it is
rooted, so to speak, in the ontology of action
...In speaking of the systematic ambiguity of
action, I am singling out what is an attribute,
the most essential attribute — of action itself'.
There is no way of eradicating or diminishing the
ambiguity of action without eliminating action
itself
.
[ 31 ]
This statement, I think, captures quite well a central
problematic in Arendt's theory. it appears that what Arendt
prizes most about action is its elusive, unknown quality
which may lead to a restoration of what she regards as
authentic political life.
2 . Action's Antithesis: Behaviorism and Mass Society
That action is not a guide to predict the future is a
central idea in Arendt's thought. Within her critique of
social science is the contention that action has become
behavior and that individuals have lost their ability to
think independently and act freely. The consequence of
action becoming behavior is that the social scientist
studies human actions in terms of regularities and behavior.
This distortion is decried by Arendt who sees the content of
action as free and unpredictable. The growth of mass
society has contributed even further to the distortion and
impossibility of action. In stark contrast to behavior,
action is a concept that is inherently ambiguous and open-
ended. Not even the actor knows the outcome of the action
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initiated, and therefore, is not bound by the determinism of
history or nature. Arendt writes:
The pe rplexity is that in any series of events
that together form a story with a unique
meaning we can at best isolate the agent who
set the whole process in motion; and although
this agent frequently remains the subject, the
'hero' of the story, we never can point unequi-
vocally to him as the author of its eventual
outcome
.
[ 32
]
Thus while Arendt's action remains free from determinism,
inevitable laws of nature, and behaviorism, it is,
nevertheless, extremely elusive and questionable. On the
face of it, claims about the absence of morality and moral
outcomes in Arendt's political action seem justifiable. But
how can Arendt be concerned with outcomes and responsibility
when she maintains that action is its own end, that it is
not a means, and that it remains unpredictable? Given her
steadfast adherence to the spontaneity and open-endedness of
action, there does not appear to be a reconciliation on the
horizon
.
While she paints a portrait of a world busily talking
politics, in which there appears to be a lack of concern for
morality it is, perhaps, in her attention to the world and
its care, or amor mundi, that her sensitivity to morality
and responsibility emerge. Amor mundi means literally,
"love of the world" and implies the joining of self with
others in a commitment to a public way of life. Elisabeth
Young-Bruehl notes that while working on The Life of the
Mind, Arendt felt that the mental capacities of thinking,
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willing, and judging also contributed to this sense of
caiing for the world. Young-Bruehl asserts that, "What
united her thought was the love she had come to understand
as the one that unites self and others — Amor Mundi."[33]
Thus, responsibility toward the world involves not only
political action in the space of appearances, but the life
of the mind and the "silent dialogue between me and
myself. "[34] In contrast to speech, which occurs between
persons in the public space, this dialogue constitutes the
sheer activity of thinking within the individual. The
individual thinks independently in a conversation with the
self which contributes to the exercise of political action.
The self-thinking in this dialogue is an important element
in Arendt's schema. A certain amount of self-thinking must
go on before an actor appears in the public space.
We find even further support for the inherent ambiguity
in Arendt's theory of action in her critiques of behaviorism
and mass society. Noting the "uniqueness and responsibility
of the individual human person" as a central theme in
Arendt's work, Dante Germino believes that it corresponds
compellingly to her critique of behaviorism and
behaviorialist social science.[35] Arendt rejects the quest
for uniformities in human nature and the "rule" of society
which, she says, "excludes the possibility of action by
affecting a kind of enforced behavior or conformism from its
members ." [36 ] According to Arendt, the possibility for
spontaneity does not exist in mass society.
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For Arendt
,
mass society is a monolith that results in
the "substitution of behavior for action ."[ 37 ] of the
social sciences, which have become "behavioral sciences,"
Arendt says they "aim to reduce man as a whole, in all his
activities, to the level of a conditioned and behaving
animal [38 ] Arendt finds that "society constitutes the
organization of the life process" and that it is a form in
which "the activities connected with sheer survival are
permitted to appear in public. "[39] For Arendt, the animal
laborans is tied to the life process which maintains species
survival and, therefore, should not be elevated to the
public realm to be equated with the glories of political
action. She maintains vigorously that "whether an activity
is performed in private or in public is by no means a matter
of indif ference .
"
[ 40 ] Arendt claims that the invasion of
the social into the public realm drives individual
differences and particularity into the private sphere
instead of the public sphere, where they publicly reveal and
validate the unique identity of the individual. Mass
society precludes any possibility for action to take place
and "demands that its members act as though they were
members of one enormous family which has only one opinion
and one interest ."[ 41 ] This point is similar to her
criticism of Plato's extension of the private character of
the household into the public sphere.
Arendt juxtaposes the spontaneity of action and its
inherent ambiguity against the regularity and repetition of
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science and the scientific method. m its search for
patterns of regularity, science and social science reduce
living phenomena to data and behavior. Germino asserts that
Adolph Eichmann is Arendt's example of the condition she
finds abhorrent. Eichmann knew how to "behave" efficiently
but could not act or think for himself.
Gabriel Tlaba finds Arendt's distinction between action
and behavior troubling because he thinks that even
repetitive and routinized activities "involve some
initiative and judgment ."[ 42 ] He believes that Arendt would
be hard-pressed to find a society without behavior.
Arendt's analysis fails to offer a plausible response to
Tlaba' s charge. Arendt's point is that contemporary society
elicits behaviorial and conditioned types of responses from
people who no longer think and act for themselves. She
fails to consider that routinized tasks have the potential
for action, and in so doing, limits the scope of action even
as she attempts to prove how expansive it is.
a. Freedom or Necessity in the Public Space ? Bernstein
points out that Arendt's clear identification of freedom and
action ("to be free and to act are the same") establishes an
important linkage from which other issues emanate. [43]
Against the background of freedom and action, emerges the
crucial distinction between freedom and necessity upon which
her political v. social, and public v. private distinctions
rest. As stated earlier, for Arendt, action can only occur
outside the realm of necessity which is tied to the
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household and the chore of keeping oneself alive. Bernstein
illustrates how significant this point is for her:
From Arendt's perspective the confusion of the
realm of necessity with that of freedom, or thebelief that somehow freedom emerges out of — or
merges with -- necessity has been one of the
most serious and disasterous confusions in modernhistory — especially since the French Revolution
.[ 44
]
For the individual, freedom constitutes breaking out of the
repetition of necessity. This can only be accomplished
through action in the public realm and appearing to others.
Of the public realm Tlaba says, "For Arendt, only
participation of the self, the revelation of one's thoughts
through action and speech in concert with others, is what
constitutes the public realm. "[45]
Arendt faults the French, and to a lesser extent
perhaps, the Russian revolutionaries for attempting to
alleviate poverty and other social ills, thereby tainting
the public realm with household and private concerns. The
"politics of compassion" is not a politics for Arendt; it is
inappropriate to address social welfare concerns in the
realm that is reserved for action and authentic politics.
Regarding the failure of the French Revolution, Arendt
states in no uncertain terms that necessity tainted the
public realm, "It was necessity, the urgent needs of the
people, that unleashed the terror and sent the Revolution to
its doom. "[46] The "politics of compassion" took over,
and poverty became a political phenomenon addressed in the
public realm. This is in contrast to the American
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Revolution which established a real foundation for freedom,
a separation of powers, and lasting institutions. Further
contrasting the American Revolution to the French, Arendt
claims
,
The direction of the French Revolution was de-
flected almost from its beginning ... through the
immediacy of suffering; it was determined by
the exigencies of liberation not from tyranny
but from necessity, and it was actuated by the
limitless immensity of both the people's misery
and the pity this misery inspired. [47
]
Arendt argues that the French Revolution was governed by
historical necessity, ideology, and terror, while the
American Revolution culminated in a conscious act of
founding that established public freedom and a space for
spontaneous action. For Arendt, revolution is not a
liberation from necessity, but rather an opportunity to
found a permanent space for freedom with lasting
institutions -- a constitution, a government organized by a
separation of powers, laws, and rights. The fatal flaw of
the French revolutionaries, according to Arendt, was the
fact that poverty became a political phenomenon, motivated
by a drive to liberate people from necessity. Arendt is
unyielding in her belief that the satisfaction of individual
or private needs, and the redress of social ills, do not
automatically occasion the achievement of freedom. But nor
does the act of founding necessarily yield freedom. A
founding can lead to a good or a bad regime; it is up to the
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founders how to proceed in establishing lasting institutions
that will create freedom.
Bernstein, troubled about Arendt's division of the
social and the political, is quick to point out that
Even when we take Arendt’s warnings with full
ssriousnes s , the fact remains that our problematic
is one in which the social and the political are
inextricably connected.
. .We can agree with Arendt
that social liberation does not automatically lead
to political freedom and that the belief that it
does can be disasterous in both theory and practice.
But we cannot avoid the consequence that political
freedom . . . can no longer be achieved for us without
an attempt to solve the serious social issues that
confront us
.
[48
]
However, Arendt does not deny that pressing social questions
exist; rather, she feels that they are best worked out in a
more technical and administrative sphere through agencies
equipped to find solutions to those kinds of problems.
Arendt's fears about the encroachment of social problems on
political life emanate from her understanding of
totalitarianism, and the absolute inability of action to
occur within an automatically functioning mass society.
Bernstein observes that Arendt understood
. . .how fragile and limited the realm of politics
really is and the dangers that result when this
realm of freedom and political action is confused
with the pressing needs and demands of social life. [49]
Arendt maintains that certain things are appropriate for the
public realm, while others must remain within the private
realm. People acting, speaking, and persuading appear
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publicly, while goodness, bodily needs, and labor should be
hidden. Arendt believes that each human activity, public or
private, has its "proper location in the world" without
which it would cease to exist. [50] The emphasis on "proper
location," "space," "appearance," and "worldliness" all
underscore Arendt' s adherence to spatial dimensions in her
political theory. Space, not time, is the key element in
her vision of political life. she is concerned with the
enduring issues, the timeless currents, which make for a
lasting public world, she leaves questions of social and
human needs to technocrats and planners, whose attempts to
improve conditions, when they cross-over into the public
realm, undermine it.
In a roundtable discussion in 1972 Arendt was dogged
repeatedly with questions from her colleagues and critics
about her radical distinction between the social and the
political. In the discussion Bernstein insists that "...one
can't consistently make that distinction ... It '
s
a question
of whether you can dissociate or separate the social and the
political consistently now. "[51] Arendt 's response to the
comment is worth quoting in full:
• There are things where the right measures canbe figured out. These things can really be ad-
ministered and are not then subject to public de-bate. Public debate can only deal with things
which — if we want to put it negatively — we
cannot figure out with certainty.
. . if we can figure
it out with certainty, why do we all need to get
together? ... everything which can really be figured
out, in the sphere Engels called the administra-
tion of things —
- these are social things in gen-
eral. That they should then be subject to debate
seems to me phony and a plague. [52]
Arendt is adamant on this point; she does not hold out any
hope that speeches, debates, hearings, and committee
discussions will find solutions to the very serious social
problems that confront us today. Her support for a
technical and administrative approach to these problems is
ironic because of her disdainful attitude toward any
approach that is an inherent feature of mass society, in
this rather contentious roundtable, her colleagues and
critics refused to let up; C.B. Macpherson and Albrecht
Wellmer pressed on questioning whether juries and town
meetings were reserved exclusively for "political" matters,
while the rest of supposedly public matters were social in
scope, and therefore required no extended debate. Weren't
social problems "unavoidably political problems ...?"[ 53
]
Arendt responded that social questions have a double face;
for example, there is no question that everyone should have
decent housing, but whether the goal of decent housing
should be achieved through integration is debatable and
therefore, a political question. Essentially, she believes
43
in the universal human right of everyone to have safe
housing, food, clothes, and rights guaranteed by law, but
the means by wh ich these goals should be achieved are not
the stuff of her politics. Thus, Arendt thoroughly upholds
her distinction and does not delve deeper into the real
subtleties of the relationship between the issues she deems
social, and the content she regards as political. Her
conceptual framework does not allow her to see the
difficulties of her restrictive, and seemingly arbitrary
distinctions and categories.
Determining what is political for Arendt, and thus a
subject worthy of public debate, seems to me the most
difficult question. What is social by Arendt's standards
and therefore ineligible to become a matter for public
debate, is, contemporarily speaking, the standard "fare" of
politics. Urban poverty, under-employment, black infant
mortality, AIDS, crack; these are commonly interpreted as
political issues that require political solutions. Such
questions are often addressed by political action, through
government assistance programs, and citizen group
involvement. But according to Arendt's schema, these
responses are symptoms of the problems with contemporary
political life.
In his analysis, Bhikhu Parekh stresses the importance
of Arendt's emphasis on distinguishing political life from
the natural and animal world, and the political actor from
the animal laborans. Parekh asserts that Arendt believed
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that the Western tradition of philosophy was ill-equipped to
confront politics because it addressed itself to nature's
order and the universe, not human life.
Parekh notes that Arendt elaborates a kind of typology
in which human beings are set apart from the natural world
by their potential to begin something new, and by their
capacity for freedom and transcendence
.[ 54 ] Human life, in
contrast to animal life, possesses the capacity to break the
recurring monotony of the natural cycle to begin new things.
Arendt' s typology originates with human life being
indistinguishable from natural and animal life, which is the
condition of the animal laborans, or the laborer. The
ability to master his animal nature and to fashion a human
world through work, takes the individual one step closer to
becoming an actor. Action manifests itself at the moment
when the individual transcends nature and begins something
new. For Arendt, the objective is to actualize what
individuals are given at birth to the fullest, and to break
away from the entrapment and monotony of the life process.
Action is the crowning moment of an individual's life when
the promise inherent in natality is realized. But in the
final analysis, Parekh is highly critical of Arendt' s tri-
partite division of labor, work, and action because they "do
not exhaust the vita activa...for many activities, such as
making love, humanitarian work, and religion, fall outside
them. "[55] In addition, he finds it troubling that Arendt
fails to address the distinctions and subtleties within each
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of the three activities of the human condition and their
relations to one another. For example, Parekh notes that
earning a living has as much to do with sustaining life as
laboring does. Similarly, there are different ways within
laboring of making a living. The three categories are not
mutually exclusive, i.e., an artist participates in all
three. [56] And while plurality is an underlying attribute
of action, the concepts of labor and work occur among
others, in a plurality.
b
- Where's the Action ? Like Bernstein and Tlaba,
Parekh argues that Arendt
' s theory of political action is
not only unclear, but it is not apparent what actually
exists in her political community besides alot of debate and
discussion. He also claims that Arendt advances two
different conceptions of politics, an agonistic view in her
earlier thought, and a more participatory one concerned with
public freedom and happiness in her later work, of these
strains Parekh says, "she capitalized on ambiguity and
ascribed to participatory politics a degree of importance
attributable only to agonal politics ." [57 ] Parekh argues
that Arendt' s standard of greatness leads her to overinflate
the glory of participatory politics because she judges it in
terms of agonal politics. Not only is the Greek style
uncommon in today's world, but the participatory politics of
the councils hardly deserve the high praise she lavishes on
them
.
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Parekh' s analysis also faults Arendt for excluding
economic and moral questions from her politics and for an
apparent lack of conflict between principles. Essentially,
he and other critics question where the issues, opinions,
and disagreements are in Arendt ’ s politics. What does an
Arendtian politics boil down to but great words and deeds
preserved for posterity by historians and storytellers?
There is little conflict over the words and deeds despite
Arendt’ s emphasis on individuals coming together in all
their uniqueness, specificity, and difference. Parekh
remarks ironically that the politics she envisions is
unlikely to happen in the world she describes: "Political
discussion here is almost like a leisurely academic seminar.
Plato abolished politics; Arendt comes too close to doing
so. "[58] This telling insight suggests that Arendt’s
political community might be construed as utopian or
cultural and aesthetic, but certainly not lively in the way
that her descriptions would have us believe. It is as if
politics were sanitized or non-existent .[ 59 ] Her concept of
rulership may, in fact, contribute to this problem. Arendt
envisions a relationship of equals fueled by a shared
commitment to a political way of life, which involves
placing the public world and good above narrowly defined
self, or group interest. Essentially, she favors a
government where there are no rulers and where a cooperative
partnership between government and citizens exists. Most
critics like Parekh, chide Arendt for her failure to account
for economic, social, and class elements that contribute to
the content of contemporary politics. They quite rightly
assert that Arendt's politics reflects little of the content
and style of today's politics.
In short, critics charge Arendt with oversimplification
and essentialism with regard to her politically defined
concepts. Arendt's phenomenological descriptions,
delineations, and recovery of politics result in a somewhat
narrow and restrictive sense of the potential possibilities
for action. As she describes the characteristics of action,
she flattens them in her neglect of the relations and
internal connections between phenomena.
For Arendt, real revolution is not the alleviation of
misery or poverty through a series of social and economic
programs, but a conscious act of establishing principles
that preserve and protect a space for politics. A
revolution is, quite literally, the constitution of
political life with citizens contributing to its ability not
only to survive, but to flourish. Revolution can lead to
the establishment of authentic political life where people
join together to create conditions for freedom in their
daily lives. Breaking with the past by means of liberation,
revolution, and founding are the steps which lead toward the
creation of a space for freedom, the goal of a revolution.
Arendt's political community is a small one with a kind of
face-to-face quality. Her vision of politics is unlikely to
take root in a large society since its size, scale, and
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odbotance are drawn from life in the Greek polis. Added to
the ambiguity, is the impracticality of her politics for a
-‘-^•‘-5®/ bureaucratic, and industrialized society.
c - The Arendtian Political Self
. in Hannah Arendt -
-ons^ience
,
Evil
,
George Kateb illuminates three
characteristics that belong to the Arendtian political
actor. First, he claims that her political actor reveals
strengths such as courage, Machiavellian virtuosity,
judgment, and eloquence. Second, the actor is a masked
persona, an identifiable character, who like a performer
creating a role, hides himself in order to reveal more.
Third, the persona allows the actor to escape the self and
for Arendt, freedom from the self is one of the most
important indications of worldliness
.[ 60 ] She maintains
that the self can only be known through appearing to others,
not through introspective self-perception which does not
become part of reality in the space of appearances. To live
outside oneself is to live for acting and being in the
world. It takes courage to leave the private realm, but
appearing in the world is, for Arendt, a main guarantee of
its reality and our shared humanity.
Arendt regards the unmasking of the self as dangerous
because it destroys the distance and the worldly space
between people which are crucial in sustaining a political
community. An unmasked persona is an unprotected self, and
this self disintegrates into a self -consuming passion. The
emotions compassion and love undermine the masks which are
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necessary conventions in the political arena Arendt
envisions. These masks keep the non-authentic self from
appearing in the public realm where according to Arendt, it
does not belong
. She maintains that we can only know
ourselves through others, and that the pursuit of selfish
and personal motives, goals, and ends doom us to an
unworldly, anti-political, and introspective fate.
Arendt maintains that love is fundamentally anti-
political and unworldly. Though it is a disclosing
activity, love, like introspection, "by reason of its
passion, destroys the in-between which relates us to and
separates us from others. "[61] The only in-between, or
mediation that exists between lovers is the child, who is a
reminder of worldliness and a sign of natality and beginning
anew. Arendt says further,
Love, by its very nature, is unworldly, and it
is for this reason rather than its rarity that
it is not only apolitical but antipolitical,
perhaps the most powerful of all antipolitical
human forces. [62]
Arendt substitutes respect for love as the proper mode of
human relations in the political community because it is
without intimacy or closeness and is mindful of the need for
worldly distance. Love also remains outside politics
because, as Ronald Beiner remarks, "it impairs judgment,"
which requires mediation and distance .[ 63
]
Arendt 's categorization of love as anti-political
contributes to her desire to maintain the public/private
50
distinction which has ramifications for the potential of
women's participation in the public realm. While amor mundi
is love that sustains the public sphere, Arendt believes
that romantic and other kinds of love die if displayed in
public. These kinds of love can only survive in the private
realm of the family or the mind. Thus, Arendt distinguishes
between amor mundi (worldly love), and romantic (private
love), which if used politically, becomes distorted. An
example of love's distortion is the French Revolution; the
revolutionaries’ compassion and attempt to alleviate
suffering became a perversion of love. For Arendt, this
manifestation of love in the public realm is unfit. As
Arendt ' s actors are male, and express their love as amor
mundi, women, who she barely mentions except for pariah
women, remain in the private sphere where love is intimacy.
Because this love never appears in public, the potential for
women to gain access to the public realm is extremely
limited in Arendt 's theory. The political action Arendt
envisions takes place within the public sphere, and not in
the private realm which, for her, is not only apolitical,
but anti-political.
While Arendt is criticized for her model of action, for
elevating ordinary participatory politics to great heights,
she herself notes that the reason for Athenian glory, short-
lived as it was, "was precisely that from beginning to end,
its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary
occurence of everyday life. "[64] Critics have commented on
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Arendt’s fondness for endowing political activity with
greatness. They believe that her standards of greatness in
politics are too high, her vision of what politics "should
be" too grandiose. Arendt speaks, I think, directly to this
criticism, standing by her belief in the sanctity and
miraculous qualities of action. she says,
...action can be judged only by the criterion ofgreatness because it is in its nature to break
through the commonly accepted and reach into the
extraordinary, where whatever is true in common
and everyday life no longer applies because every-thing that exists is unique and sui generis...
Thucydides, or Pericles, knew full well that* hehad broken with the normal standards for everyday
behavior when he found the glory of Athens
...[ 65 ]
Arendt believes that the political community inspires
individuals to achieve extraordinary things and to perform
great deeds. Even in her shift from agonal, immortalizing
politics to the participatory politics of the American
Founders, she clings to the mantle of greatness as a
significant element of action.
Arendt saw the council system as a viable space for
action, one that would fill the void left by the Athenian
polis. In On Revolution
,
Arendt focuses primarily on how
the revolutionary spirit embodied in the American revolution
can be preserved and channeled into establishing permanent
spaces and institutions for action. Arendt believes that a
commitment to the growth of democratic institutions and
principles fosters public freedom and happiness, thereby
increasing the prospects for genuine political action.
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—
tyles o£ Action: Agonal and Participatory
. m
order to examine and scrutinize the content of Arendt's
politics, it is necessary to look at what she believes
creates the conditions for action; that is, what is
political action's context. Arendt's examples of specific
actors are sparse, for instance she mentions Achilles,
Homer, Pericles, and Jesus, the last of whom she says
discovered the human capacity to act. [66] The Periclean
funeral oration serves as an agonal model of a courageous
act. Arendt's idea of courage suggests that happiness
requires freedom, and freedom requires taking risks, being
courageous. she speaks more about human actors generally,
rather than of specific individuals. Arendt's conception of
actors hinges on an opposition between the agonal style of
the Greeks and the participatory view of the American
Founders
.
While Achilles and the Greeks exhibit the agonal
spirit, John Jay, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson represent
the participatory view for Arendt. The agonal actor is
characterized by a consuming drive to excel and to attain
greatness through courageous acts in which the risk of death
is often an element. This is in stark contrast to the
American political ethos which Arendt so highly regards.
The play of different opinions, persuasion, compromise, and
legislation, the last of which the Greeks considered to be
pre-political, are the standard fare of the participatory
politics Arendt praises in On Revolution. However, despite
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the divergence in her perspectives, her concepts of freedom
and worldliness remain a common element in both. Founding,
speaking, acting, and constitution-making lay the groundwork
for freedom. Arendt would agree emphatically with Kateb's
assessment of her idea of freedom, "Freedom exists only when
citizens engage in political action. "[67]
On Revolution is the source of Arendt' s ideas about
action from a participatory political standpoint. Simply
distilled, Arendt
' s political action is political speech.
Arendt states:
Political action is therefore direct partici-
pation in the conversation of diverse equals,
or more rarely, in written composition for the
occasion. The typical result is a conclusion:
a decision, a choice, a judgment, a rule. [68]
The model for Arendtian, participatory style action is her
understanding of the council system. Arendt perceives the
councils arising spontaneously as organs of the people,
although they are comprised of a self-selecting elite who
"... politically ... are the best..." and who choose
specifically to take responsibility for public business and
happiness
.[ 69 ] This notion of a self-chosen elite indicates
the elitist, anti-democratic strain in her participatory
view of political action. Arendt states:
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f?'
SUCh an
' aristocratic' form of govern-
ment would spell the end of general suffrage aswe understand it today, for only those who as volun-
an ' elsmentary republic' have demon-strated that they care for more than their privatehappiness and are concerned about the state of theworld would have the right to be heard in the con-duct of the business of the republic
.
[70
]
Thus, Aj_ endt maintains that certain individuals are more
capable and more interested than others of placing the
public business ahead of their own private happiness. Her
political elite, or class, consists of a small group of
people who act in the public realm and transact the public
business. These actors, or leaders do not represent anyone
but themselves
,
which begs the question of what everyone
else is doing in such a community. In Arendt’s schema there
are those who are excluded from the practice of politics and
who possess what she regards as an important "negative"
liberty originating from Christian times, namely "freedom
from politics ." [71 ] Thus, Arendt’s political elite takes up
the business of politics while the rest of us are "excused."
Instead of her version of political leadership, what we are
left with is a system of representation, which while she is
skeptical of it, is consistent with her belief in "freedom
from politics . "
Arendt is often appropriated by the left as a radical
democrat because she describes a political community with
democratic institutions, processes, and direct face-to-face
participation. Her depiction of the council system and
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admiration for the Jeffersonian ward system locks like the
practice of direct democracy. Arendt's political world of
conversations among diverse equals who disclose unique
identities before one another sounds
, at least on the
surface, like direct democracy. However, despite such
democratic overtures and indications, her notion of a self-
selecting elite puts her in a different camp. it is,
indeed, difficult to square her respect for participatory
politics and the idea of people coming together, speaking
and acting, with the formation of a self-selecting elite
sprung from "the people," a nebulous and misleading concept
in itself. Conservatives have appropriated her thought
precisely for the elitism embedded in her notion of
political leadership.
Thus, the politics she describes sounds democratic on
some level, but is actually quite restrictive in substance
and the scope of participation and leadership. For
instance, not everyone is a participant/actor in the
Arendtian political community. Nor does everyone get the
opportunity to become part of the politically elite,
leadership cadre. It is, in fact, unclear exactly who would
be acting, except the spontaneously arising, self-selecting
elite who are perceived as reliable guarantors of the public
realm, trustees of public freedom. Arendt's rather limited
view of citizenship makes it difficult to imagine other
kinds of actors and action in the public realm. She
ascribes public identity and political virtues to American
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Founders Jefferson and Adams, clearly part of the political
elite of their time. Although she values the diversity and
differentiation of peoples in her political community, her
sense of political participation is not inclusive; her idea
of citizenship is limited.
Despite her apparent elitism, Arendt calls civil
disobedience a form of contemporary political action and
finds it praiseworthy. Civil disobedience is also a form of
action that is inclusive, falling within a genuinely
participatory framework. Her analysis of it is striking in
contrast to her overall portrayal of action arising
spontaneously, carried out by a self-selecting elite.
Arendt defines civil disobedience as concerted, pointed, and
sustained action that emerges from the shared agreement of a
group. Organized minorities who share common opinions
employ civil disobedience. The elements of spontaneity and
a self-selecting elite do not exist in her description of
civil disobedience. This is but one of several notable
divergences in her thought on action. Still, the aspects of
resistance, critique of current political practices, small-
scale, and inclusiveness give civil disobedience as action,
a distinctly Arendtian feel. For Arendt, civil disobedience
is a legitimate means of exercising action and voicing
protest to policies which organized minorities find harmful
to the body politic.
Her admiration for the Jeffersonian ward system of
elementary republics, which failed to materialize during the
57
creation of the American republic, stems from her concern
with the potential for people to corrupt government with an
infusion of private interests. The ward system proposed by
Jefferson sought to divide the republic into wards, county,
and state republics, and the union of each to form a
'gradation of authorities .'[ 72 ] Jefferson was interested in
giving people more of a stake in public affairs, not merely
providing them with a vote by which they could exercise
their private capacity for citizenship. Rather, he sought
to create spaces in which all people were members of the
body politic and could be heard. Of Jefferson Arendt says:
"What he perceived to be the mortal danger to the republic
was that the Constitution had given all power to the
citizens, without giving them the opportunity of being
republicans and of acting as citizens ."[ 73 ] For Jefferson,
the ward system of government allowed everyone to experience
and partake in a share of public freedom and happiness. But
Arendt 's respect for this system does not seem to extend
into her own idea of politics. She clearly opposes full
participation. It is perhaps her fear of mass society
supplanting the possibility for an authentic political life
that prevents her from endowing "the people" with the
potential to act. This fear of the masses is a pervasive
thread running through her ideas on participation. As
masses, they are not equipped to act, but Arendt 's analysis
of totalitarianism implies that any potentially viable
politics has to come to terms with their break-up. Only
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when mass society is diffused, and individuals claim their
ability to think for themselves and act with others, can an
Arendtian politics emerge where care for the world is
primary.
While Arendt is fascinated with the ward system, she
maintains her elitist bias. She infuses the ward system
with her preference for a leadership '’class." The elite and
democratic strains within her political community make her
position difficult to ascertain. While Parekh interprets
Arendt s consideration of town meetings, worker's councils,
Juries, and constitution-making as evidence of the breadth
of her politics, he also counterposes his observation with a
critical and skeptical impression:
Arendt 's concept of action is so abstract that it
does not connect with the world. For her, action
represents man's capacity to transcend nature and
necess ity . . . for her, action is not only a supranatural
but a supernatural activity. in action man performs
'miracles,' creates the 'extraordinary' and the 'un-
predictable,' and 'reveals' himself. Action appears
from 'nowhere' and cannot be causally explained. [ 74
]
With a mix of different impressions such as this one, it is
no wonder that Arendt 's action perplexes and confuses so
many students of political theory. Parekh' s observation
also points to an irony; he asserts that Arendt' s action is
•so amorphous, it fails to connect with the world and
reality. This is ironic since one of the linchpins of her
theory of action is rootedness in the world, the space of
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human appearances. Indeed, Arendt may have thwarted
central idea to her theory unknowingly.
very
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CHAPTER III
ARENDT'S CONCEPT OF THE PARIAH
A. Who is the Pariah ?
Having reconstructed Arendt 1 s theory of action, its
ambiguity and the requirements for political life, I turn
now to the concept of the pariah. I will examine the pariah
to provide an understanding that illuminates both its limits
and its possibilities. Examined against the background of
action, I will pose the possibilities that exist for a
relationship between the pariah and political action.
During the course of this chapter, I hope to glean from
Arendt s writings in what sense she might have envisioned a
^ ionship between the pariah and action. Nowhere in her
writings does she make explicit whether a direct
relationship exists between the two ideas, though she often
implies that they share common characteristics; I want to
examine those characteristics.
Arendt 's The Jew As Pariah
,
The Origins Of
Totalitarianism
,
Rahel Varnhagen
,
Men In Dark Times
,
and
Eichmann In Jerusalem
,
among other works, function as
touchstones which provide access to her thought on the
complex issue of Jewish identity, a pariah identity, in the
modern world. Arendt 's concern for political action which
pervades all of her work is developed, in part, through her
understanding of the Jewish experience in the modern age.
Her articulation of the pariah's identity and potential
contribution to political life is colored by the interplay
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of the Greek, Roman, and American aspects of her thought.
She takes these inheritances seriously and they influence
hei thought on the pariah quite profoundly. in addition,
her contributions to the debate over Zionism, Israel, and
the future of secular European Jewry in the Diaspora inform
and influence her ideas significantly.
The major tensions and conflicts that ripple through
Arendt's thought rise to the surface within the context of
her examination of the pariah. For example, there is the
^ ^ icul ty of reconciling Arendt's notion of masked actors
with her plea for an unveiling of Jewish identity, revealing
it as it is. Here, the parvenu's falsification of Jewish
identity is fruitless, because it undermines a key
requirement of politics Arendtian style; that is, the
assertion and disclosure of a specific human identity, in
this case, a Jewish identity. Acting in the public realm
with what we are given by birth is Arendt's focus. She
explores the facades donned by Jews eager to escape social
prejudice through Rahel Varnhagen, the 18th century German-
Jewess whose salon was a mainstay of both the Goethe cult
and Romanticism during the time of Frederick the Great's
enlightened despotism. Her meditation on Varnhagen' s life,
as well as her reflections on the attitudes of newly arrived
Jewish emigres in America, are reminders that we cannot
escape what is "given" by birth. To try to do so
constitutes a renunciation of the human condition of life
itself. The desperate attempt on the part of so many Jews
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to assimilate constitutes, for Arendt
,
an escape from Jewish
identity and a renunciation. Arendt denounces such an
escape as a foolish ploy that fails to confront the Jewish
question in political terms. The parvenu assimilationist
views the issue in a social light, which is to grasp at ill-
fated mechanisms to secure social acceptance that is not
automatically guaranteed. Social acceptance, believes
Arendt, does not necessarily provide rights or an
opportunity for political participation. But she does not
specifically offer the pariah a means of direct access to
the public realm other than to acknowledge his dilemma as
political, and in so doing, points to his potentially
political characteristics.
Arendt ' s discussions of the pariah occur in the context
of her Jewish writings which precede her work on action and
are found in The Jew As Pariah
,
The Origins Of
Totalitarianism
,
and Rahel Varnhagen
. Arendt' s concept of
the pariah also enters into others of her works in relation
to the public v. private and the political v. social
distinctions. Arendt' s characterization of the pariah, a
social outcast and a Jew, depicts the plight of a marginal
individual who does not fully belong anywhere. The social
outcast she describes is the conscious pariah, a Jew with a
critical consciousness, a rebel against his own people and
the rest of society.
S 7
B • The Conscious Pariah
Although she does not explicitly state whether the
pariah must m fact be a Jew, the concept, as she elaborates
it, is bound specifically to Jewish experience in the
Diaspora through the modern era. Her concept of the pariah
is informed by the Jewish history of exclusion and
worldlessness
,
and set squarely against the background of
anti-semitism and totalitarianism. Arendt views all Jews as
pariahs but distinguishes between those who she calls
conscious pariahs, who are aware of their marginal status
in Jewish society and in relation to European culture and
who rebel against them politically, and the majority of
parvenu Jews who attempt to assimilate and who, at best, are
"accepted” only as exceptions. she believes that the
majority of Jews sought the parvenu route as an attempt to
hide their Jewish identities and to become assimilated, in
Arendt
' s view, those Jews failed to cultivate a genuine
political consciousness, to see their lives in broader
political and legal terms. Arendt 's biographer Elisabeth
Young-Bruehl notes,
In her terms, a Jew could be either a parvenu
or a pariah, and she made it very clear in dis-
cussions and later in her writings that she thought
only a pariah could develop a truly political con-
sciousness, only a pariah could affirm his or her
Jewish identity and seek, politically, to provide
a place for Jews to live without compromising their
Jewish identity. . .What astounded her about so many
of the Jews she worked with was their failure to
think politically, to realize the necessity for
Jewish solidarity in the European--the world--
crisis
.
[ 1 ]
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Arendt's distinction between politically conscious
pariahs and social climbing parvenus comes from Bernard
Lazare
,
the French-Jewish lawyer and Dreyfusard. Lazare
believed that the pariah must rebel not only against the
dominant society that rejects him and mandates social
uniformity, but also against the parvenu mentality. Lazare
believed that the conscious pariah’s opposition to the
parvenu would begin to bring about a change in Jews'
thinking about their status. Lazare' s courageous support
for Dreyfus engendered the wrath of Jews and non-Jews alike,
thus he was a rebel on two levels. Arendt regards Lazare as
the first person to translate the problem of the pariah into
political terms:
Lazare 's idea was, therefore, that the Jews
should come out openly as the representative
of the pariah, 'since it is the duty of every
human being to resist oppression...' he wanted
him (the pariah) to feel that he was himself re-
sponsible for what society had done to him. [2]
The pariah of the pre- and post-Emancipation Diaspora lacked
such a sense of responsibility and did not feel himself to
be culpable, rather, he interpreted the fact of his
Jewishness like an accident or a personal misfortune, and
later, as an individual psychological attribute .[ 3
]
The distinction between pariah resisters and socially
malleable parvenus corresponds to Arendt's separation of the
political and the social. According to Arendt, by narrowly
construing their problems as mere social adjustments to be
made, parvenus could not enter the political realm as real
actors/participants because they rejected their Jewish
identities. Their private sense of themselves as socially
prevented them from entering the public realm. In
contrast, Arendt says that the conscious pariah resisted the
impulses of social inferiority with courage and independent
thought. The conscious pariah understood his plight in
political, rather than social terms. Lazare believed that a
revolution needed to occur within Jewish life that would
constitute a change in parvenu thinking and an awareness of
the world. In this way, the pariah would become aware of
his condition and fight it, rather than continuing to
participate in, and thereby perpetuate a system of gross
inequality.
Published in 1955, and written over a period of twelve
years, Arendt ' s collection of biographical essays Men In
Dark Times coincides with her concerns in The Jew As Pariah .
Though not considered "traditional" political theory, these
essays pay tribute to some great individuals, non- Jews among
them, who exhibit a way of life akin to the conscious
pariah's and who serve as examples of amor mundi and
resistance. In this work, Arendt demonstrates her interest
in broadening the concept of the conscious pariah, yet the
thrust of the "tradition" is anchored firmly in Jewish
Diasporic history. [4] The non-Jewish individuals she
examines in Men In Dark Times : Isak Dinesen, Randall
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Jarrell, and Karl Jaspers, among others, are representative
"lights" in the dark times of the first half of the 20th
century. While respecting the facts of the human condition,
tney also nurture the possibilities for its development.
Arendt acknowledges the differences between them, but weaves
a common thread between their love of humanity and their
lack of estrangement from the world.
ihe conscious pariah who Arendt privileges possesses a
critical consciousness, a capacity to resist oppression, and
to see the Jewish question in political terms. Marginal,
both with respect to Jews and to the dominant culture, the
conscious pariah often takes unpopular and courageous
stances publicly and wrestles privately with identity.
Arendt 's pariahs move in different worlds and experience
tensions resulting from their European and Jewish
identities, thus finding it difficult to be at home
anywhere. They chafe against the predominantly Jewish
parvenu mentality, and are shunned at times by their own
people. As advocates for human rights and political
resistance, their voices are often unheard and insights
unheeded. These conscious pariahs: speakers, writers,
storytellers, and rebels are accepted neither by their own
people, nor by the European society Arendt refers to in her
writings
.
As stated earlier, Arendt' s understanding of the Jewish
experience in the Diaspora significantly informs and
influences her view of an authentic political community.
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Aiendt generalizes from the Jewish experience of
worldlessness and exclusion to envision a politics in which
the pariah might participate. Botstein remarks,
The Jews, once excluded from politics ... could
remain as they were historically (with all the
characteristics of Jewishness in the secular
European sense) and enter a new political realm...
The redefinition of politics in her mature thoughtpermitted Arendt to believe she could preserve the
special character of the Jew while permitting him
to leave behind his pariah status and participate
as an equal with other free citizens in a pluralistic
society. [ 5
]
Thus, Arendt characterizes the Jews as a pariah people
without a home and a place of belonging in the world, and
therefore, unable to have a political stake. To join the
world, so to speak, and become responsible for it, the
pariah must fight for legitimately guaranteed political and
legal identities which are, for Arendt, the two most
important identities. Any possibility for political
participation and amor mundi are not possible without these
identities. Arendt relates that the Jews' Diaspora
experience of wandering, worldlessness, close business ties
with the state, and an overall cultural isolation all
culminated in a lack political awareness and responsibility
for the care of the world.
1 . Worldlessness or Participation ?
Arendt envisions a political space in which Jews appear
as Jews without hiding their Jewish origins and changing
their identities. She regarded America and Israel as two
Places for genuine political participation and the
proliferation of secular Jewish life. Arendt relates that
even after Emancipation in Europe, there remained structural
barriers which prevented Jews from claiming a stake in the
political community. social prejudices remained pervasive
and limiting factors in the exercise of political, legal,
and social rights which came about very gradually as a
result of Emancipation. But perhaps more importantly, these
liberties were ignored or suspended at will by governments.
However, even the small amount of social and political
relief that came as a result of Emancipation was not
completely taken advantage of by the Jews, many of whom
preferred to take the assimilationist route. in post-
Emancipation Europe, after the decline of close court
relationships, Jews maintained their distance from
governments. And Arendt maintains that reforms during
Emancipation did not automatically guarantee Jewish
political participation. In Eastern Europe, the Jews
remained just as downtrodden and discriminated against as
they ever were. In the post-Emancipation Europe Arendt
speaks of, there was little Jewish political participation
with the exception of Zionist pariah politics and socialism.
Though she disagreed vehemently with the kind of state
that was eventually established, the creation of Israel
partially satisfied the political world she envisioned for
the pariah. And although she was an ardent Zionist up until
the founding of Israel, she eventually broke with Zionists
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over the way in which Israeli nationalism manifested itself
in a close tie between a people and a territory. The
creation of Israel may have resolved the "physical" aspect
of Jewish homelessness, but the pariah's collective identity
remains profoundly marked in a historical sense by a
spiritual homelessness. a collective sense of dislocation,
displacement, and disconnection remain a part of the
identity of the Jew as pariah. Homelessness remains a part
of the mindset and frame of reference for Jews, and thus,
becomes an element of their collective identities.
The pariah may now have a means of political
participation and a place to call "home," Israel, but the
pariah Jew has used the government and the system to create
a new wave of homelessness. Arendt's thoughts in 1944-50 on
the creation of Israel were incredibly prescient; she
forecasted Palestinian homelessness and intense Israeli
nationalism, and was opposed to Israel becoming a monolithic
Jewish culture. Her support for a bi-national Arab-Israeli
state made her an outcast in many influential Jewish circles
and caused her to formally break with Zionists. The
creation of the new state of Israel failed to satisfy
Arendt's idea of a proliferation of secular European Jewish
culture, of Jews living as one among many cultures. Thus,
while the Jews are not literally homeless in the sense of
having a homeland, and they are political actors, Arendt
remained opposed to the strict identification of a
particular people with a land. For Arendt, this
identification promoted a virulent nationalism and
conditions in which, inevitably, her vision of politics
would fail to take root. America, rather than Israel,
became Arendt’s prototypical political space and community
for the pariah, a place where secular European emigre Jewry
would flourish and prosper.
Arendt's concern with the world and political action
underly the significance to her theory of being in and of
the world, of acting in the space of appearances. This
concern characterizes the pariah’s dilemma; the importance
of belonging, participating, and caring for the world
suggest that the pariah needs to find a point of entry and
access to politics. Arendt's analysis suggests that the
pariah's exclusion and estrangment from the world need to be
overcome by his claiming Jewish identity.
Arendt's concern with the parvenu embracing and
asserting Jewish identity rather than evading it, stems from
her deep commitment to worldliness and political action.
For Arendt, in order to belong to the world, individuals
must act with others in the public space to reveal and
disclose their unique identities. To experience one of the
aspects of action, the interplay of different opinions and
beliefs, individuals must appear in all their specificity
and present their particular views. An individual brings
unique aspects of his identity to the public realm and these
are accentuated and further differentiated through political
action. In a sense, we are made more fully human in the
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process of political action. Yet how does the pariah's
disclosure of identity square with Kateb's interpretation of
Arendt's masked actors expressing distinct personas and
playing roles? While Arendt opposes the parvenu's
deliberate masquerading of Jewish identity, she prefers some
form of societal convention to none in the public space.
For Arendt, there are authentic and inauthentic social
conventions. of the two, masks are authentic conventions
that preserve distance between people and difference, which
she believes counteracts tendencies toward mass uniformity.
Therefore, she views conventions like masks, as safeguards
of difference which also protect minorities from a
potentially overbearing majority. The masks prevent private
traits and interests from entering the public space where
they can corrupt and interfere with the exercise of
political action. if the pariah joined the public realm, it
is likely that he would assume a persona or a role, thus
conforming to Arendt's idea. But the pariah's initial
commitment remains to acknowledge and embrace his given
identity.
2 . The Pariah's Characteristics
Humanity, "in the form of fraternity," is one of the
characteristics of the pariah which Arendt says is commonly
found "among persecuted peoples. "[6] But this type of
humanity is paradoxical as Arendt explains:
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This kind of humanity is the great privilege ofpariah peoples; it is the advantage that the pariahsof this world always and in all circumstances canhave over others. The privilege is dearly bought;it is often accompanied by so radical a loss of the
world, so fearful an atrophy of all the organs with
which to respond to it... that in extreme cases, in
whicn pariahdom has persisted for centuries, we can
speak of real worldlessness
. And worldlessness
,
alasis a form of barbarism
.[ 7
]
The warmth of the pariah's humanity evolved through the
experience of persecution and oppression. However, Arendt
believes that this warmth contributes to the disappearance
of the world, the "interspace” between us. [8] when the
space and differences between people disappear, there is
little hope for the world and a diminished potential for
political action. Expressed in the simple fact of being
alive, warmth can bring out the best in people, but comes
largely through the pariah's "privilege of being unburdened
by care for the world. "[9] Care for the world depends upon
the maintenance of differentiation between all peoples which
is expressed in the public space, and on freedom established
by means of political action. Kateb maintains that,
Freedom and worldliness can serve as the terms
that stand for what Arendt prizes most. She
regularly connects them; she sees them as dependent
on each other. Freedom exists only when citizens
engage in political action. Political action can
taka place only where there is worldliness--a common
commitment to the reality, beauty, and sufficiency
of the culture or way of life that sustains political
action . .
.
[ 10 ]
77
Fearing the pariah's worldlessness and a loss of Jewish
identity are Arendt 1 s central preoccupations. Related to
these concerns, is her strenuous criticism of the parvenu's
denial of Jewish identity. This rejection amounts to
nothing less than the substitution of things given (physei)
for ready-made identities (nomoi). Her biography of Rahel
Varnhagen illustrates this point; one is born with a destiny
and certain facts of existence. To reject what is given is
to reject the human condition, to alienate oneself from it
and from oneself. Arendt relates this idea to her own life
in a response to Gershom Scholem over the Eichmann
controversy:
I have always regarded my Jewishness as one of
the indisputable factual data of my life, and I
have never had the wish to change or disclaim
facts of this kind. There is such a thing as a
basic gratitude for everything that is as it is;
for what has been given and was not, could not
be, made, for things that are physei and not
nomo
.
[ 11 ]
This basic gratitude constitutes the pariah's acceptance of
the human condition, the facts of birth and unfolding
destiny.
Arendt describes the characteristics that are "given"
in the Jewish pariah identity in the essay "We Refugees"
written in 1943, shortly after her arrival in the United
States. "All vaunted Jewish qualities — the 'Jewish
heart, ' humanity, humor, disinterested intelligence -- are
pariah qualities [12
]
The pariah is distinguished by a
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capacity for speaking, thinking, and story-telling, all of
which have sustained the Jewish people in their wanderings
throughout the Diaspora. The pariah engages in critical
observations of the world which spring directly from his
exclusion from it. The pariah, a marginalized non-entity in
relation to the world, speaks a discourse of the heart and
mind and maintains a critical perspective and distance
.[ 13
]
The pariah brings an outsider's independent perspective
to events and is free from the sway of powerful and
»
entrenched interests and biases. [14] As an outsider, the
pariah does not belong to conventional social groupings, and
thus is not wedded to a particular set of interests; this,
in effect, constitutes the pariah's freedom. Arendt argues
that the history of Jewish exclusion has given the pariah a
certain kind of freedom, though bought at a high price, as
an outsider with no status. As an outsider, the pariah
often risks taking an independent perspective which
manifests itself in unpopular positions and stances.
Unlikely to gain social acceptance in conventional society
on his own terms, these risks hardly jeopardize the pariah
who distinguishes himself from others through them. The
pariah's unique stance contributes to the growth and respect
for difference in the Arendtian political community. The
pariah's speech and thought constitute a bridge between
private life y and a potential entry into the political realm.
Arendt' s view of the pariah identity renders it potentially
useful to political action because it is a critical
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identity. This, in effect, is the legacy of the conscious
pariah, a critical stance engendered through exclusion and
an acute awareness that the Jewish question must be
politically construed.
The German-Jewish historian Heinrich Graetz perceives
of similar pariah characteristics in the Jews. He maintains
that the Diaspora gave Jews in particular, experiences of
"Inquiring and wandering, thinking and enduring, studying
and suf f er ing .
"
[ 1 5 ] The Jewish experience of suffering is,
however, different than the kind of misery and suffering
that Arendt ascribes to the French revolutionary era. The
pariah's experience of suffering is a result of social
persecution and prejudice, rather than a misery induced by
poverty, deprivation, and squalor. The French revolution
failed, claims Arendt, because of the people's pressing
social needs and suffering forcing their way into the public
realm. In contrast, the pariah's suffering resides within
the collective identity of pariah people as a shared
experience, rather than becoming a tool used to alleviate
misery resulting from economic degradation. Though the
pariah's moral embeddedness makes him attuned to the general
suffering of humanity because he is denied access to the
public realm, this empathy and his own suffering, pose no
threat to the political.
In contrast, Botstein claims that thinking, a central
feature of Arendt ' s "active politics was held to be a
particularly European Jewish virtue. "[IS] And Arendt
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maintains that Kafka's work characterized thinking as "the
new weapon — the only one with which, in Kafka's opinion,
the pariah is endowed at birth in his vital struggle against
society ."[ 17 ] Kafka's depiction of thought as "an
instrument of self-preservation," characterizes his
understanding of the pariah according to Arendt.[18] This
weapon is presented in contrast to the traditional pariah
responses which entail a retreat from the world into the
company of other pariahs, and the poetic withdrawal into the
beauty and awe of nature where everyone is equal.
The pariah is a speaker and a thinker who has the
potential to develop a critical and political consciousness
of his marginal condition. Arendt ' s conscious pariah does
not experience self-alienation; his awareness constitutes
the exact opposite: an affirmation of unique identity and an
acceptance of the facts of his birth. However, the
conscious pariah is estranged from the world such as it is.
Ironically, this estrangement and distance from the existing
society foster a thorough-going critique of prevailing
conditions. Distance from the prevalent norms of society
engenders a critical perspective concerned with humanity and
the world at large. Stories, satires, conversations, and
dialogues that attempt to reconcile, and understand the
world from the outsider’s point of view emerge from the
pariah's critical distance. But does this critical distance
allow the pariah, ever the outsider, to fully enter into and
participate in the public space as envisioned by Arendt?
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The central issue here is whether the pariah can assume
a public voice as an actor in order to create a "home" in
the world and a place of belonging. Given Arendt's stress
on being situated in the world and her insistence on Jews
assuming a share of responsibility for its maintenance, it
is clear that she envisions the pariah becoming a full and
equal participant in political life. I think that she sees
the pariah's participation as a significant contribution to
a more vital and enlivened politics overall.
One place where the pariah finds acceptance and
belonging is among diverse individuals in the environment
Rahel Varnhagen sought to create in her 18th century salon.
The salons of the late 18th century spawned a pariah culture
of sorts outside conventional societal boundaries. These
alternative public spaces encouraged dialogues among diverse
equals and offered a measure of worldliness. Here rebels,
storytellers, poets, writers, critics, and bizarre
representatives of the intelligentsia and cultural literati,
"exiles" from both the Jewish and non-Jewish sectors of
society, found a rich sanctuary of cultural and intellectual
ferment. The pariahs characterized by Arendt reject the
route of assimilation and conformity and refuse
exceptionalism
,
choosing instead to affirm their particular
identities in and through their work and the salon
gatherings. The salon corresponds to the public space that
Arendt envisions for dialogue, debate, and thinking about
politics. It is also notable that these alternative public
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spaces were initiated mostly by women who had no other realm
in which to experience discourse. in what follows, I will
explore the lives of two women who represent different
aspects of the pariah experience. As conscious pariahs,
these women contributed to the growth and cultivation of
worldliness among those traditionally regarded as outsiders.
We are now in a position to explore the pariah status
described in the preceding section through the lives of two
pariahs with whom Arendt was fascinated. How does the
conscious pariah identity constitute itself in these two
women? What can their lives tell us, if anything, about the
pariah's potential for political action? Using these women
as illustrations of the conscious pariah, I will examine the
plausibility of an affinity between the pariah and political
action
.
I chose Rahel Varnhagen and Rosa Luxemburg as two
representatives of the pariah "tradition" because they
exhibit contrasting elements of the pariah identity, are
from two different eras, and lived their lives quite
differently from each other. Rahel exemplifies the private,
introspective strain of the pariah's intense, personal
struggle to reconcile the desire for social acceptance with
a refusal to deny Jewish identity. Varnhagen had few
contacts with whom she could experience the world and share
her suffering over her uncertain identity and lack of
status
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Rosa is a pariah of a different kind and temperment.
While Rahel struggled to gain experience and status in the
world, Rosa, with the exception of the time she spent in
prison, was an extremely public person with access to the
public realm. when she was not writing or in prison, she
spent her time in the company of her peers and party
members, speaking publicly, and generally "doing” politics.
Rosa represents an exception in that most pariahs, and most
women during the era in which she lived, remained in the
private sphere of the family without access to the public
realm
. In what follows, I sketch briefly the lives of these
two pariahs.
a. Rahel Varnhagen
. Arendt's portrait of Rahel
Varnhagen, the late 18th and early 19th century salon
hostess, and Goethe cult organizer who was a major influence
on the Romantic Movement, was written over a nine-year
period. Arendt's first published book-length work not only
illuminates the characteristics of a conscious pariah, but
probes the complex inner struggle through which she comes to
terms with her Jewish identity. It is a work of self-
definition and exploration, a painfully rendered portrait of
a woman laden with an unfolding identity drama, tortured by
introspection and enlightened by the salon culture she
helped stimulate.
As a young woman, Varnhagen kept her Jewishness at a
distance through introspective, self-searching which filled
a void in her life caused by society's rejection. But over
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a period of years, Varnhagen overcame her tendency toward
self-destructive introspection as she matured through the
experience of the salon and other events in her life. As
she experienced the world through the salon, her struggle
with her Jewish identity assumed a less interior form.
Rahel had neither beauty nor wealth, and for women of
this era in Berlin, these factors constituted a measure of
power and status. With nothing to her credit but her
tendency for passionate thinking and her sensitivity toward
people, she drew a group of the most diverse and well-known
figures of Romanticism into her salon for a brief period.
Initiated during the late 18th century, a time of increased
and intense attempts at assimilation among German Jews,
Varnhagen' s salon defied Prussian social conventions of the
time. Her salon was considered unconventional both by Jews
who were attempting to assimilate and by the rest of
society, which viewed Varnhagen' s gathering of major
Romantic figures with a mixture of surprise and curiosity.
The typical pariah traits of "...humanity, kindness,
freedom from prejudice, sensitiveness to injustice," all
belonged to Varnhagen, whose intense struggle over her
Jewish identity enabled her to better understand both the
pariah and parvenu aspects of her personality .[ 19 ] While
Varnhagen' s parvenu mentality led her to the conclusion that
she needed to escape her Jewishness in order to gain social
entry and acceptance into Prussian society, she could not
bring, herself to entirely blot out her Jewish identity by
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playing the necessary games. While she attempted to enter
society by undertaking the role of the parvenu, Rahel clung
stubbornly to the hope that luck, which Arendt says is "the
natural miracle of pariahdom," would improve her lot in
life. [20] Varnhagen struggled for years with her desire to
join the ranks of fashionable society and her need to
maintain her Jewish identity.
Arendt concludes that what made Varnhagen a conscious
pariah was her increasing awareness of the importance of
accepting tne fact of her Jewish identity. Acceptance meant
understanding that her destiny was inextricably linked to
the human condition and the world. Rahel explored her
pariah status by means of the salon and her various
interactions with people. Varnhagen' s struggles to be
accepted by the society at large, as well as her gradual
coming to terms with the fact of her Jewish identity without
qualification make her a conscious pariah. Though her
struggles assumed an interior form residing mostly in the
realm of thought, they were also expressed through a rich
and abundant correspondence and in the dialogues of the
salon culture which constituted her world.
Varnhagen is a rebel because she could not reconcile
herself to discarding her true identity through the
construction of a new one. To do so would be to sacrifice
and to deny her Jewish identity and her essential nature.
Of this sacrifice, Arendt says, "One had to pay for becoming
a parvenu by abandoning truth, and this Rahel was not
her
prepared to do. "[21] Varnhagen's rebellious spir
establishment of a salon "counter-culture," and the activity
of her thinking and speaking establish her as the conscious
pariah Arendt privileges. Her independence and courage
became a way of refusing to be an exception, shunning the
relative comforts of the parvenu and the uncertain path of
assimilation
.
Established in opposition to conventional society, it
was a place Oi acceptance for those who made a conscious
decision, albeit one fraught with ambiguity, neither to
assimilate, nor to deny their Jewish identities. Thus,
Varnhagen's pariah world of the salon becomes a political
space and constitutes "world" in Arendt ’s terms. The
congregation of diverse equals in conversation,
storytelling, acts of speech, recovery and remembrance with
others becomes compatible with the practice and requirements
of Arendtian action. These elements of the salon culture
are political for Arendt and offer a means by which the
pariah can participate in the world. Though it is an
alternative public space, the salon offers all of the
worldly elements that Arendt admires. Principles of
mutuality and plurality manifest themselves in the
atmosphere of the salon, in which recognition of emergent
and diverse identities occurs through the give and take of
speech. Spontaneity, unexpectedness, and the other
attributes of action are also present in the salon.
Language and dialogue constitute the link through which a
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relationship between the pariah and political action can be
consummated.
k*
_
osa Luxemburg. in Men In Dark Times
, Arendt
extrapolates from J.P. Nettl's biographical account of Rosa
Luxemburg. Arendt' s essay illuminates Luxemburg's pariah
status both within the socialist movement and the German
Social Democratic Party. she notes with favor the critical
role of Luxemburg's Polish- Jewish peer-group in maintaining
a source of the revolutionary spirit in the 20th century.
Of Luxemburg, Arendt writes that "even in her own world
of the European socialist movement she was a rather marginal
figure, with relatively brief moments of splendor and great
brilliance ..."[ 22 ] Like other conscious pariahs Arendt
reflects upon, she remarks that Rosa's role in the movement
and the party was little recognized, and thus after her
death, she remained a misunderstood figure in the history of
Polish socialism. Arendt discounts most of the popularized
accounts of Rosa's life, preferring to understand it through
the context of the pariah.
Luxemburg, Arendt notes, was an unorthodox Marxist who
sought above all else to improve existing world conditions
which "offended her sense of justice and freedom .
"
[ 23 ] Her
support for revolution stemmed from her moral commitment to
improve conditions for working people. This commitment
compelled Luxemburg to lead a life in the public realm,
wedded to the destiny of the world and to socialist
political possibilities. Her interest was not only in the
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working class, but in the larger world context of a European
politics, and how the working class might fit into the world
scene. Arendt praises Luxemburg for attempting to transcend
nai row, nationalistic boundaries and for going beyond an
exclusive concern with the working class to advance a
republican program" for the German and Russian socialist
parties, which Arendt notes, was an idea that only
strengthened her pariah position
.[ 24
]
The Polish-Jewish peer-group which nurtured Luxemburg
captures most of Arendt' s attention. The peer-group, says
Arendt, embodies the revolutionary spirit which she believes
has been a long neglected facet of Luxemburg's life. Much
like Arendt 's own peer group described by Young-Bruehl
,
Luxemburg's circle consisted of secular, middle-class Jews
with German cultural and intellectual backgrounds. Arendt
writes that Luxemburg's peer group shared similar political
affinities, common moral standards, and
stood outside all social ranks, Jewish or
non-Jewish, hence had no conventional prejudices
whatsoever, and had developed, in this truly
splendid isolation, their own code of honor --
which then attracted a number of non- Jews
.[ 25
]
Arendt suggests that this moral code gave the group a kind
of legitimacy and credibility. In the same vein, she
asserts that Rosa's family, which did not have strong
socialist leanings, risked everything to support her. This
unique Jewish family background was a formative influence on
the moral code of the peer group. Such a demonstration of
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moral allegiance represents an unconditional trust and what
Arendt refers to as "moral taste," or the kind of ethical
code that formed the core of Rosa's beliefs. The code
possessed principles of equality, "mutual respect and
unconditional trust, a universal humanity and a genuine,
almost naive contempt for social and ethnic distinctions
were taken for granted. "[ 26 ] The world of the peer group
was "home" to Rosa; it supported her and provided her with a
sense of solidity.
This background, often unnoticed by critics, is the
framework against which the peer group spurned societally
mandated distinctions and prejudices to create an opposition
to conventional society and politics. Rosa built her
socialist vision from the richness of her peer group and
milieu. But despite her humanism, she maintained an
aversion to the women's emancipation movement. Her distaste
is striking during an era in which many progressive women
were drawn into the movement. Like Arendt ' s own views on
women's equality, Luxemburg believed that maintaining social
differences between men and" women was a good thing, making
her a pariah among progressive women. But Arendt concedes
that Luxemburg's outsider status was "not only because she
was and remained a Polish Jew in a country she disliked and
a party she came soon to despise, but also because she was a
woman. "[27] Thus, Arendt ' s women pariahs bear a further
pariah strain because they are women.
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A pariah status is felt more intensely by women because
as women, they have extremely limited access to anything
even remotely resembling a public space. For Varnhagen and
Luxemburg, the salon and party respectively, provided
alternative public spaces in which they could create and
participate in the discourse of their particular eras. In
Varnhagen' s case, it is very significant that she initiated
the idea of a salon in her home. Unable to participate in
and experience the world, Varnhagen brought the world to
her, and with her limited experience she fashioned a world
out of individuals, who like her, were shunned by
conventional society. in creating a pariah society
Varnhagen and her associates established a place of
belonging. The salon enlarged her experience and provided a
space in which to act. In her private capacity, lacking in
status as both a pariah and a woman, Varnhagen chose to act
and to affirm the critical traits of the pariah
consciousness, extending them to create an alternative
space. The salon transcended the narrow boundaries of the
conventional society that shunned the pariah, and encouraged
independent and free thinking. Ideas were circulated,
discussed, and debated. Political action's vigorous
interplay of differences and opinions emerges within this
context
.
Similarly, Luxemburg's pariah politics in the SPD
provided a forum for her entry into socialism and an
opportunity to press demands on behalf of the downtrodden.
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Luxemburg emerged as a leader of her party, something that
might never have been possible in a conventional political
party. Her moral fervor and commitment to promoting the
cause of world socialism, constitute her decision to act in
the world. Her decision was a choice made against
isolation, passivity, and estrangement from the world. The
choice she made to act and to resist, has something in
common with Arendt's theory of political action. Although
Luxemburg sought to alleviate human suffering and
degradation, which for Arendt is clearly an anti-political
impulse, she remains an example of a conscious pariah.
Despite this tendency, Arendt suggests that Luxemburg's life
was committed both to action and to preserving the
revolutionary spirit, and morally praiseworthy because of
her grounding in the Polish peer-group.
While Arendt credits Luxemburg's and the Polish peer-
group's continuous opposition to existing political and
social arrangements, she criticizes Luxemburg's late
acknowledgment that the "secret of this defiance was willful
noninvolvement with the world at large and singleminded
preoccupation with the growth of the Party
organization. "[ 28 ] Arendt interprets this willful non-
involvement with the world as a distinct loss of the world.
Despite her criticism, Arendt links Luxemburg's maintenance
of constant friction with society to the preservation of the
revolutionary spirit, which she also associates with the
pariah. Luxemburg's support for continuous opposition to
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society provides us with the idea of the pariah consciously
choosing to act defiantly by spurning society, rather than
being spurned. In this way, the pariah "steals" the
prerogative of society by snubbing it, and by providing a
critique of existing conditions. Luxemburg's belief in
maintaining constant friction with society is grounded in
the concept of the conscious pariah itself, and in her moral
commitment, which is both an inherent part of her pariah
identity and a "gift" from the peer-group. The pariah's
heightened sensitivity and awareness of societally mandated
discrimination and prejudice engenders a defiant reaction
against it. The pariah's perspective on the idea of
resistance to society stems directly from a moral commitment
to opposing any kind of oppression.
Arendt's essays on Rahel Varnhagen and Rosa Luxemburg
are attempts to come to terms with two complicated women.
Her characterizations constitute a project of reclaiming and
recognizing the pariah in various manifestations. Arendt
views Varnhagen 's and Luxemburg's experiences and life
stories as artifacts that contribute to the world. Their
lives provided what sense of immortality mere mortals can
hope for in the way they experienced the world, in their
deeds and words. Arendt herself becomes a chronicler of
immortalizing action in her narrratives on Varnhagen and
Luxemburg. She contributes to the story of action by re-
creating Varnhagen' s life story as she might have told it
and lays bare unacknowledged facts about Luxemburg in an
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effort to make both live on in memory. This effort is
Arendt's understanding of action, storytelling and
remembrance. Thus, Varnhagen's and Luxemburg's lives
constitute stories about the importance of identity. For
Arendt, both Varnhagen and Luxemburg were conscious pariahs
because they lived what they were given, affirmed their
identities, and attempted to build a "home" in which they
could act freely.
That Varnhagen and Luxemburg were women does not escape
Arendt
,
but she does not hold them up as examples for the
cause of feminism. Illustrating women as specifically
political beings was not Arendt's central concern, though
she considered the facts of their lives, such as Varnhagen's
lack of sophistication, beauty, and wealth as political
givens, not irrelevant personal data. [29] Arendt thought of
women's issues in terms of her distinction between the
political and the social; she felt that they should be part
of a larger political struggle and opposed efforts to
establish the demands of women as an interest group. In a
similar vein, Rosa Luxemburg felt that the oppression of
women, like that of Jews, would cease with the advent of
genuine socialism.
c. Arendt's Political Identity . Having established
Varnhagen and Luxemburg as representatives of the pariah
tradition, I believe that it is appropriate from now on to
refer to the pariah as a "she." It is also necessary to
become briefly acquainted with Arendt's understanding of
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identity. Arendt's emphasis on care for the world expressed
through action is essentially an identity forming activity.
Also crucial to her concept of political action is a public
disclosure of unique identity. While the pariah's identity
is a collective one, it is not, according to Arendt's
schema, automatically public, and therefore not political
unless there is access to the public space. In such a
space, the actor has the opportunity to disclose a specific
and individual identity through words and deeds which are
recorded as stories and historical narratives. Through
their preservation, the actor attains what little sense of
immortality a human being can possess. As stated in Chapter
Two, the actor becomes a distinct "who" as opposed to a
"what," an assemblage of qualities that are reducible and
quantifiable, and therefore reproducible, only by means of
political action. Of the "who", Arendt says,
This disclosure of "who" in contradistinction to
"what" somebody is -- his qualities, gifts, talents,
and short-comings, which he may display or hide --
is implicit in everything somebody says and does.
It can be hidden only in complete silence and per-
fect passivity, but its disclosure can almost never
be achieved as a willful purpose, as though one
possessed and could dispose of this "who" in the
same manner he has and can dispose of his
qualities
.
[ 30
]
The "who" is one of a kind, while the "what" consists of
various personality traits that are mass defined and
produced such as emotions, passions, and interests which
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belong exclusively to an individual's inner life. The
"what" has nothing whatsoever to do with the public realm.
Arendt maintains.
The moment we want to say who somebody is, our
very vocabulary leads us astray into saying what
he is; we get entangled in a description of quali-
ties he necessarily shares with others like him;
we begin to describe a type or a "character" in'
the old meaning of the word, with the result that
his specific uniqueness escapes us. [31]
The "who" is key for Arendt because she believes that the
route to political action is through an assertion and
disclosure of unique identity, and not in laying bare
private aspects of a self that can never be known. To
become a "who" through politics is for Arendt the highest
existential opportunity.
If we can know the "who" publicly, Arendt is not as
hopeful for the properties of the "what." She disdains
modern subjectivity and is disparaging of psychoanalytic
claims that we can know ourselves
.[ 32 ] She argues that we
can never know the self and that a search for self-knowledge
yields self-hate and self-alienation. Yet this view
presents the following difficulty: the pariah undoubtedly
undergoes an intense, inner deliberation process in
confronting the issue of identity. The pariah's soul-
searching seems unavoidable. But what kind of identity will
the pariah embrace: the socially ambitious parvenu or the
pariah resister? Will the pariah become an ardent Zionist
nationalist, or the rebellious critic of society?
It would seem that the pariah, by virtue of her
outoider status and unceasing battle over identity, would
travel the treacherous route in search of self-knowledge
everyday. Or perhaps, more accurately, the conscious pariah
actually struggles with self-def inition while the
parvenu/assimilationist pariah runs away from such struggles
by escaping from Jewish identity. But perhaps the
consciousness of the conscious pariah is different from the
self-knowledge that Arendt disdains because its critical
content focuses outwardly on society, rather than
concentrating in an inward and self-destructive manner. The
conscious pariah's awareness and sensitivity are directed
toward how she might fit into the world and contribute to
it. In contrast, the self-conscious pariah concentrates
energy inwardly on how she can change herself in order to
conform to existing societal norms. The conscious pariah
somehow achieves the delicate balance required to be
conscious, without being destructively self -conscious in the
way Arendt disdains.
d . Unity or Disunity between the Pariah and Action ?
In some ways the pariah's sensibilities are similar to the
properties of action. Like the actor, the pariah takes
courageous and independent positions, responds with a new
and often alternative perspective to the unexpected, and is
unfettered by biases, preconceived notions and interests.
Also like the actor, the pariah attempts to make a break
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with the old and encourage something new and unprecedented,
and ultimately larger than herself. Both individuals
envision a "whole,” in which a new set of arrangements and
thinking further a respect and esteem for the world. Both
the actor and the pariah become caretakers of the world.
However, while both the pariah and the actor are bold
and visionary, the pariah's role is more prophetic and
defiant. The pariah is morally bound to resist oppression
by rebelling against it wherever it exists, while the
actor's moral obligation manifests itself in a basic love
and respect for the world, amor mundi
. And this may be the
most important factor that separates the pariah from the
actor. The pariah is especially bound to a moral framework
because of a direct experience of oppression and injustice.
By contrast, the Arendtian actor is not inherently obligated
to follow a code of political and moral resistance.
Ideally, her actor acts in accordance with amor mundi which
is morally suggestive, but not strictly compelling.
The strongest argument against the pariah becoming an
actor emerges within Arendt’s own theory, by virtue of her
continual emphasis on preventing private traits from
entering the public realm where they may become fodder for
politics. In Arendt's view, these private traits which
include introspection and its corrollary, self-absorption
,
are dangerously corrupting if they infiltrate the public
realm. For the pariah, the distinction between the
political and the social manifests itself in the strict non-
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admission of self-conscious practices into the public space
which, according to Arendt, do not encourage the growth of a
political identity.
Arendt
' s critique of introspection, which is reflected
in her portrait of Rahel Varnhagen, weakens the likelihood
of a relationship between the pariah and action. Her
critiques of compassion and self-absorption also provide
ample evidence of pariah characteristics and private traits
which prevent political participation. Arendt believes that
compassion destroys the worldly distance between people that
sustains the world and political action; it is politically
" irrelevant and without consequence.
" [33 ] Arendt argues
that the content of political action, "talkative and
argumentative interest in the world is entirely alien to
compassion, which is directed solely, and with passionate
intensity, towards suffering man himself [34
]
Kateb argues that Rahel Varnhagen is Arendt' s "most
extended meditation on the existential inadequacy of the
inner life. "[35] Arendt ' s narrative on Rahel Varnhagen '
s
life illustrates how introspection and the interiorized
world of self-consciousness ensure obfuscation of an
authentic self, thereby tending to obstruct the process of
accessing and affirming the self through participation in
the world. Kateb underscores Arendt ' s concern with
introspection and self-knowledge: "There is another kind of
self-absorption equally fatal to the political realm... That
is the concern of the self with the self, with its own
inwardness. "[36] Since Arendt believes that we can never
know the self she naturally thinks that "trying to be
fulfilled in one's inner process is to misspend one's
life. "[37] This, essentially, describes Rahel Varnhagen and
the Platonic philosopher.
Arendt s concern with introspection stems from its
promoting the appearance of unlimited power in isolation
from the world and reality. Indifference to the world is
the consequence of introspection, in which the inner self
becomes a shrine. She states:
If thinking rebounds back upon itself and finds
its solitary object within the soul -- if, that is,
it becomes introspection — it distinctly produces
. . .a semblance of unlimited power by the very act
of isolation from the world... it also sets up a
bastion in front of the one 'interesting' object:
the inner self. in the isolation achieved by in-
trospection thinking becomes limitless because it
is no longer molested by anything exterior; be-
cause there is no longer any demand for action.
.
.
Even the blows of fate can be escaped by flight
into the self
. .
.
[ 38
]
In this state of mind everything has already been
anticipated, thus foreclosing any possibility of spontaneous
action; political action cannot occur where everything has
been foretold. For Arendt, introspection spawns protective
generalities without foundation, instead of truth and
understanding of experience. These generalities do not
reveal the person, or the "who," but signal a descent into
personality and the "what." According to Arendt, meaningful
political activity cannot occur in a public realm tainted
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with emotions and feelings and a self-conscious, uncertain
identity. Arendt maintains that the protective "comfort"
of introspection poses a threat to political action in its
preoccupation with the inauthentic self.
In contrast to the introspective pariah, the Arendtian
actor finds a complete identity and becomes individuated
through a commitment to a political way of life through
action. This occurs only through a distinct loss of self or
the "what," rather than in obsession with it. Rosa
Luxemburg is the most obvious manifestation of the conscious
pariah s commitment to a political way of life. Luxemburg
represents a selfless public figure, a political person
whose identity as a "who," an authentic self, emerged in her
political practices.
But Arendt remains concerned about the pariah's
inwardness and acute sensitivity to humanity which raises
her fears about the human heart, the seat of suffering and
compassion. Of the French Revolution she says, "Where
passion, the capacity for suffering, and compassion, the
capacity for suffering with others, ended, vice began. "[39]
Arendt defines the heart as
a place of darkness which... no human eye
can penetrate; the qualities of the heart
need darkness and protection against the
light of the public to grow and remain what
they are meant to be, innermost motives which
are not for public display. [40]
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To the adage "Know Thyself" Arendt would say, "Thyself
cannot be known, motives and goals cannot be foretold or
anticipated." The idea of the heart as a guide to action is
preposterous to Arendt; action is its own guide and its own
end
.
e * The Relationship between the Pariah and Action
.
Kateb's analysis suggests that a potential actor must live
outside the self where an authentic identity and self will
emerge. This identity is forged by participating in the
world, therefore, a commitment to a political way of life
must be made. l_f the pariah can live life in this way,
there is a chance for participation. Arendt's analysis
suggests that the pariah is capable of making a commitment
to living outside the narrow confines of the self, but not
always willing. Her analysis in the "The Jew As Pariah: A
Hidden Tradition" of Bernard Lazare's attempt to instill the
pariah with a consciousness of her condition notes, "The
decisive factor was not the parvenu ... Immeasurably more
serious and decisive was the fact that the pariah refused to
become a rebel. "[41]
Also in this vein, Kateb speaks of Arendt's pairing of
freedom and worldliness as key to the emergence of genuine
political action, and thus, a route to participation. The
commitment to worldliness, however, must first be
established; that is, a life outside introspection.
Underscoring Arendt's emphasis on worldliness, Kateb
maintains
,
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To live outside oneself and for the sake
of acting from a principle is to live freely,
free of the necessities of body, heart, and mind.
To live with others loyal to the same or to a
ffsrent principle is to live in a free world.
[
42 ]
In relation to the pariah, Kateb's interpretation of Arendt
implies that the pariah can participate if she takes an
interest in the world and the risk of a life outside
introspection. The question then, becomes whether or not
the pariah is capable and willing to make a commitment to
worldliness, and whether she can be free enough of "body,
heart, and mind" in order to cast her lot with the world.
The pariah's commitment to worldliness emerges in the
form of a resistence to oppression and injustice. By
choosing to act on the awareness of oppression and
discrimination, the pariah's worldliness comes to light. In
choosing to emerge from the darkness of the self by acting
on a moral principle, the pariah joins others in caring for
the world. Thus, in addition to this moral commitment, the
pariah's speech and storytelling abilities, as well as the
founding of alternative spaces all constitute a connection
between the pariah and action.
The challenge where the pariah is concerned is to
participate in the public realm and to contribute something
to sustaining the world. But does the pariah cease to be a
pariah if the commitment to worldliness is made? This
question hinges on the assumption that the elements which
exclude the pariah are the same ones that make the pariah a
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pariah. According to Botstein this challenge is overcome,
or at least negotiated, by infusing the pariah's capacity
for speech, storytelling, creation of alternative spaces,
and resistance to oppression, into the public realm. These
pariah contributions, gifts to the world, in their own way,
constitute political action and correspond to Arendt’s idea
of a political community. Affirming the positive aspects of
the pariah identity by admitting them into the public space,
leaving behind the lack of status and sense of social
inferiority, do not necessarily mean that the pariah ceases
to be a pariah. On the contrary, the pariah's sense of
collective identity is enriched by an affirmation that
materializes and is validated publicly. With this
affirmation, the problem of the pariah's lack of status —
political, legal, and social, would be left behind.
Leon Botstein’ s essay "Liberating The Pariah: Politics,
The Jews, and Hannah Arendt" provides support for a
relationship between the pariah and action. Botstein argues
that a shift takes place in Arendt ' s thought from a sharply
critical view of the private, to a more sympathetic one that
lends support to the contribution of pariah characteristics
in the practice of political action. Botstein argues that
Arendt "...saw, in America, the authentic prospect of a
political life (as she conceived politics) for Jews. "[43]
She understood America as a place where Jews could appear as
Jews, shedding the pariah's lack of status without
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discarding positive, secular European pariah qualities, of
the shift in Arendt's thought he states,
The redefinition of politics in her mature thoughtpermitted Arendt to believe she could preserve
h
special character of the Jew while permittingim to leave behind his pariah status and parti-
cipate as an equal with other free citizens in
a pluralistic society.
[
44 ]
Arendt's later thought frees the private traits of the
pariah from the formerly pejorative sense with which she
associated them, launching them formally into the public
realm. Botstein maintains that her emphasis on individual
speech and action "could allow a particular Jewish
character, originally developed in pariah conditions to
cont inue .
"
[ 4 5 ] He argues that Arendt envisions a secular
Jewish culture in America, much like the European one that
she left behind. Botstein asserts that her interpretation
of post-Emancipation era anti-semitism, the European Jewish
secular tradition, Jewish nationalism, and American
politics, culminate to establish the "origins" of her theory
of action.
Speech and thought constitute the bridge between the
private sphere and the public realm for the pariah. For
Arendt speech jis political action and also a pariah skill
which can contribute to the restoration of politics.
Arendt, Botstein advances, believes that Jewish political
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participation in a confederation of peoples could eradicate
pariah status without destroying the uniqueness of secular
European culture. Botstein underscores the significance of
language to participation in the Arendtian political
community,
A political renaissance for modernity which uti-lized the traditions of the Jewish pariah becameArendt s normative objective for collective lifein the modern world. if political action could~be
centered on the use of language, the once pariah
European Jew could emerge as an exemplar of politicalparticipation
.
[ 46
]
According to Botstein, the pariah's contribution to
political action is language; through language the pariah is
individuated, and connected at the same time to the public
realm and action. Through speech, the pariah contributes to
the restoration and reinvigoration of politics and the
revolutionary spirit. In effect, Arendt transfers the
exceptional elements of Jewish history and pariah culture
and places them into a political context where they are
generalized. Botstein says, "The European history of the
Jewish pariah, the legacy of a nation without a home or
politics, became in Arendt political action in the ideal;
the Jewish experience generalized. "[ 47 ] If this is
accurate, the pariah establishes a solid relationship with
action, in which pariah characteristics are infused into the
public realm, and the lack of status which marked her
earlier, is left behind.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A
‘ ft ionsh ip between the Pariah and Action
The comments of Arendt and others on the pariah suggest
that neither an "escape'' through assimilation, nor a total
reconciliation of Jewish identity are likely. For Arendt,
escape through assimilation, and exclusion in the form of
Zionist nationalism represent two extremes, both fraught
with difficulties. The pariah identity is worked through
precariously, at best. Arendt 's views suggest that living
with the contradictions and the inherent ambiguities may
provide some direction in the pariah's search for a home and
status. Embracing the contradictions may foster the
critical inquiry and engagement that promotes an interest in
the world and political action. This critical engagement
emerges in the conscious pariah's resistance to the
oppression of conventional society.
Though it would appear that Arendt ' s political
community is quite restrictive, I believe it is plausible to
claim that a relationship exists between the pariah and
action. Although Arendt does not posit the existence of
such a relationship, there is evidence to suggest that her
concept of the pariah informs her theory of action. The
pariah can be seen as a participant, and a leader in
Arendt 's political community even though it is both elusive
and restrictive. The pariah's compatibility with action as
Ill
defined and characterized by Arendt, hinges largely on the
faculty of speech which, in her terms, constitutes political
action
.
In Arendt, one can also get a good idea about what
constitutes the political by understanding what it excludes.
The excluded elements manifest themselves in the
introspective side of the pariah which, if admitted to the
public space, thwart the kind of authentic politics Arendt
envisions. The pariah as pariah, that is, the pariah who
fails to become a conscious pariah, is excluded from
Arendt s public realm. Her politics does not give the
pariah who fails to become conscious of her position, and to
nurture this consciousness in the form of resistance and
'-'^’itigue, an opportunity to join the public space. Arendt 's
hope for the pariah's affirmative and critical qualities
outweighs her concern over the potential encroachment of
introspection and the other self-oriented traits into the
public realm. The conscious pariah's moral grounding, a
capacity for critique through the preservation of distance,
expression through language, and a willingness to confront
and resist oppression, all contribute to the enlivening of
Arendt’s political action. Arendt’ s concerns with aspects
of personality, and introspective self-searching invading
the space of action, can be held at bay to consider the
pariah's positive characteristics. That is, those which are
compatible with action, are world-enhancing, and which make
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a positive contribution to the sustenance and enrichment of
the public space.
In Chapter Three, I have outlined in some detail the
elements of the pariah's identity which are compatible with
the properties of action. I have discussed the pariah's
unique moral grounding and commitment which are instrumental
factors in acts of resistance to oppression. These acts,
are in fact, forms of action. But do the responses offered
thus far resolve the problem that this study sets out to
explore? Namely, can the problem of the pariah, a lack of
public space and feeling of caring for the world, two
elements which Arendt values highly, be resolved by
providing the pariah an opportunity to participate in the
public space? My response to this question is yes, the
pariah will find a home in the world if she first becomes
attuned and conscious to her lack of status. Once this
consciousness is secured, the affirmative and critical
pariah traits can be understood while the negative ones can
be left behind. if the pariah acknowledges her plight as
political, there is a chance for participation in Arendt’
s
vision of the public space. Participation may also come in
the form of small alternative, non-mainstream, public
spaces, something altogether different from what Arendt
envisions. But it is clear that only with the cultivation
of a critical consciousness does the pariah have any hope of
acting in the Arendtian sense. The pariah's continuous
opposition to, and critique of injustice and oppression
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emerge even more powerfully once she claims a legitimate and
authentic stake in the public space.
Within Arendt
' s work, the connection between the
pariah's speech and action culminates in the conversation
and storytelling of the salon. in the political space of
the salon, these acts of narrativity and discourse, recovery
and remembrance, allow the story of the authentic self to be
told. This story, told in the presence of others, becomes
the story of action, an example of a life projected into the
world rather than an experience of estrangement and
withdrawal. Through the action of storytelling, an
individual's unique identity is illuminated. It is Arendt'
s
belief that we glean meaning and understanding from these
stories of identity. The disclosure of unique identities in
the public space also ensures and protects the notion of
difference, an important concept for Arendt. The pariah's
distinctive character traits, those which affirm a critical
identity, are preserved and projected into the public space.
While the pariah's collective, and public identities emerge
in spaces like the salon, the pariah's individual identity
also appears, thus working further toward ensuring the
preservation of difference in the political community. The
relationship between the pariah and action manifests itself
when the pariah's introspection gives way to a new
understanding of self and world. For Arendt this new
understanding emerges through storytelling and language
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which are the relation of experience and understanding, and
essentially, public acts of disclosure.
With the extension of pariah traits into Arendt
'
s
public space and speech as political action, the pariah's
identity is affirmed and accepted as one among others. As I
stated earlier, this does not necessarily imply that the
pariah is no longer a pariah upon entry into political life.
The pariah's collective identity remains intact. Formed
through a common history and experience, it is an identity
shared with others of similar backgrounds and inheritances.
The positive characteristics of the pariah identity adhere
and are accentuated in the public space, but the negative
status changes. This negative status is shed for an
enlargement and a generalization of the positive features of
the pariah identity. The pariah finds a home either in the
construction of alternative public spaces or in the
conventional political arena where she continues to function
as a gadfly and a critical resister. Botstein comments that
Arendt generalizes the pariah experience, extending its
significance until it comes to play a critical role in
political life. It is possible to see Arendt transposing
affirmative pariah qualities to the public realm where they
contribute to its growth and enrichment. Arendt seeks to
bring the pariah into the world without fundamentally
changing the positive traits in her character. Botstein'
s
remarks suggest that the pariah's essential character is not
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compromised by participation in the public realm, and that
on the contrary, it flourishes in a diverse community.
Arendt's Rahel Varnhagen
, her Jewish essays in The Jew
—
Pariah
'
and The Origins of Totalitarianism
, precede her
work on political action. These formative writings on the
pariah and related themes contribute significantly to her
later formulation of the theory of action. Botstein argues
that Arendt's depiction of speech as political action was
made by way of her study and understanding of the Jewish
question. The Jews' quest throughout the modern era for
freedom from prejudice and a cessation of their experience
of powerlessness are significant to her theory of action.
Her concern with the statelessness, worldlessness
,
and
homelessness of the Jewish people stems from her interest in
securing them legitimate political and legal identities
during the pre- and post-WW II eras in Europe. For Arendt,
a truly human individual cares for the world and contributes
to its artifacts by participating in political, hence,
worldly acts. Only by acknowledging the legitimacy and
worth of these identities did Arendt think that the pariah
would be able to assume a stake in maintaining a commitment
to public life. A legitimate status is gained by entering
into, and participating in the affairs of the world, which
for Arendt, are first steps toward the exercise of political
action
.
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B
- Pariah: Political Outsider or Political TnsirW ?
If it is plausible to claim as I have throughout this
study, that the concept of the pariah informs Arendt's
theory of action it is, then, reasonable to advance that
this concern can be extended to the problem of political
outsiders more generally. Her overriding concern with the
sustenance of amor mundi and the preservation of worldliness
suggests that finding points of access and entry into the
world for the pariah and the political outsider is a
desirable and appropriate activity. The pariah's capacity
for speech, storytelling, critique, moral sense, and
resistance to injustice contribute to a more enlivened
political community, if put into practice in the public
space. In order to gain legitimacy and status, the pariah
must employ these capacities, or remain a political and
social outsider. Though Arendt's idea of citizenship and
leadership are limited, her work suggests that the pariah
need not remain a political outsider. Arendt's political
vision, her reading of the American founding, and
interpretation of what Israel could be, all point to her
interest in creating access to the public realm for the
pariah. The possibility of the pariah's contribution to,
and enrichment of the public space are every bit as
important to her theory as action itself. Her concept of
political action is meaningless without actors, the agents
who bear a responsibility for carrying out the public
business
.
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The pariah's moral responsibility would be a welcome
complement to, and enhancement of the Arendtian actor, who
as agent, acts without regard to outcome. Without a moral
commitment, this actor bears no responsibility for the
action. The only way out of this dilemma, as I discussed
earlier, is to acknowledge Arendt's commitment to the world
(amor mundi ) , as an inherently moral one that her actors are
predisposed and wedded to. But for those who still find
morality lacking in her sense of action, I would argue that
the pariah's moral underpinnings can be considered a real
contribution to the practice of political action.
In the public space, the pariah gains status and
legitimate standing in the political community while
managing to retain the positive traits which characterize
her unique collective identity, while the pariah's lack of
status outside the public space and unique, collective
identity combine to make the pariah a pariah, Arendt clearly
favors discarding this negative status and affirming
positive pariah traits through the practice of political
action. These characteristics which make up the collective
identity of the pariah, contribute to the diversity and
quality of political discourse. Except for acquiring a
legitimate status, the pariah's essential nature and
identity remains unchanged. As a new member of the public
space, the pariah retains the memory of her previous lack of
status which helps to ensure a continued critique from a
point inside the public space.
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Botstein's comments point to Arendt 1 s concern with the
preservation of a collective pariah identity by admitting
the pariah into public life. The extension of pariah traits
into the public realm would encourage the specifically
Jewish European, secular character that Arendt speaks of to
continue, its existence guaranteed through the pariah's
participation in political action. Arendt wants the
particular collective identity and character of the pariah
to take root in a public life that ensures a diversity of
collective and individual identities. According to
Botstein, Arendt's theory of action constitutes an extension
of the Jewish pariah experience into a universal norm.
While the pariah experience of speech, thought, and critical
inquiry is nurtured in conditions unique to the political
outsider, these conditions can also be created inside the
public space. Arendt's political community seems not to
take the pariah out of the pariah, so to speak, but to
generate and enlarge the possibilities for the emergence of
unique identities through action.
Like the dissidents and former political outsiders who
currently lead the newly emerging democracies and multi-
party systems in Eastern and Central Europe, Arendt's
conscious pariahs participate in and become leaders in
public life. Once outsiders, banned, persecuted, and
interrogated, these pariahs have become leading figures in
their countries' new governments. Given the current
dynamics and political openings in these countries, which
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have no longstanding democratic and pluralistic traditions,
Arendt's concept of the pariah and its contemporary
relevance are considerable.
In her essay "The Jew as Pariah: A Hidden Tradition,"
Arendt characterizes four individuals whose lives and works
exemplify the plight of the conscious pariah: they are
Bernard Lazare, Heinrich Heine, Charlie Chaplin, and Franz
Kafka. Of the four, the plight of Kafka's character "K.,"
in The Castle
,
most resembles the current situations of
pariahs, former opposition members who now find themselves
cast in the role of political leaders. Arendt notes that
Castle is the only Kafka novel in which the hero is
clearly Jewish, and though he is not marked by any
specifically Jewish attribute, his struggle dramatizes the
typical plight of the assimilationist
. K's dilemma is that
he is neither a member of the village, nor does he belong to
the Castle: put simply, he "fits" nowhere. Arendt
characterizes K. as Kafka's man of goodwill who struggles to
attain basic human rights and to determine his own destiny
in a difficult situation. He wishes for no special
dispensations from the Castle, and he refuses to accept the
villagers' superstitions. K. thinks for himself and makes
his own way along the ambiguous path toward assimilation on
his own terms. One man's life and struggle for basic human
rights becomes a symbol for the villagers. After he dies,
they realize that they, too, can insist on their human
rights and dignity.
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The plight of K. shares something in common with the
paiiah as dissident in the contemporary political
configurations in Eastern and Central Europe. The new
government leaders in these countries are attempting to
build a respect for human rights into their societies. They
are attempting to show people who are used to accepting
their fates blindly, who had little or no recourse against
the things that happened to them, that they have the right
to expect more and that they are ultimately, responsible for
the health of their societies. Most importantly, the pariah
leaders maintain that the corruption and lies with which
people have lived for years, must be cleansed from political
life in order for them to believe that they do have a real
stake in the decision-making processes of government. The
vast majority of people in these countries have little
experience in establishing a democratic system of government
and are learning that building a democracy takes work; it
takes time to establish legitimacy.
1 • The Pariah's Changing Critique
Perhaps it is true that the nature of the pariah's
critique changes in countries where dissidents, members of
the opposition and underground are now holding power in
their new, or soon to be elected governments. How could
their critique not be affected when at one time, as
outspoken dissidents and opposition members, they were
imprisoned for their views? Vaclav Havel's example
illustrates the dramatic revolution of a pariah who has
risen to the ranks of the new political leadership in his
country in just a few months after being released from
prison. Havel is a pariah, who in Arendt
' s terms, helped
create the new public space and also very much retains his
pariah features. The consequence is a change in status for
everyone who was oppressed by the Communist system and a
growing understanding of democratic tools and principles.
It is difficult to say how his critique has changed as a
result of his change in position, but there is little doubt
that the memory of one's pariah experience cannot easily be
erased or forgotten. Havel and other leading dissidents,
once political outsiders, now legitimate insiders, maintain
a consciousness of their former pariah statuses as new
leaders. They also publicly affirm positive pariah
characteristics, legitimating them politically for everyone.
As a leader of a newly formed government, the
dissident's ideas and opinions are now legitimated through
the initiation of democratic processes and principles such
as human rights, respect for law, and free, periodic
elections in which representatives are popularly elected.
These pariah leaders: dissident intellectuals, trade
unionists, artists, and former members of the underground,
cannot help but retain in memory what most people's lives
were like as indistinguishable drones in a one-party
communist system. The consequence of a country of pariahs
is self-alienation
,
and an estrangement from the capacity to
establish and participate in some kind of nourishing public
life. Such a possibility does not exist for the pariah as
pariah. The consequence of this same group of people
resisting their oppression and forming new parties and
governments, and pressing for democratic reforms, is that
all the various pariah peoples will gain a legitimate
political status. The memory of what their lives used to
be, as well as the processes by which they rebelled against
old ways, constitute the maintenance of the pariah
consciousness. The pariah's moral embeddedness and ethical
resistance are the key features that live on in this
consciousness. The pariah as dissident's experience of
living without basic human rights and freedoms, being under
surveillance, being banned, labeled subversive,
interrogated, and generally, being oppressed in life and
work, is a virtual guarantee that her basic character will
remain intact.
It is the preservation of the memory of this experience
that infuses morality into the new system and prevents its
possible corruption. The nature of the dissident's critique
of the political system and the structure of society may
change as a result of an elevation in status, participation,
and leadership in the government, but the fact of its
existence and perpetuation are maintained. Vigilance
through critique and opposition continue in the new
government, and coincide with Arendt's concept of amor
mundi, which requires the preservation of a certain kind of
distance of which both are a part. Distance is embedded in
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Arendt's notion of care for the world. And the pariah,
whether she assumes political leadership or not, may never
feel completely comfortable in the world. Critic James
Bernauer associates this sense of discomfort with Arendt's
concept of amor mundi
,
whose demands he claims involve "the
preservation of a certain distance, the willingness not to
conform, the permanent status of what Arendt called the
conscious pariah. "[1] Thus, as much as responsibility and
care for the world, distance and resistance are integral
elements of amor mundi. The pariah's distance and
resistance foster critique and correspond to Arendt's notion
of caring for the world.
This is, perhaps, how the problem of the pariah is
resolved. Arendt's concern for being situated in the world
and unestranged from it, is resolved by deploying the
affirmative characteristics of the pariah, and also by
understanding the notion of distance embedded in the concept
of amor mundi.
2 . The Contemporary Significance of the Relationship
between the Pariah and Action
Arendt's elusive political community has an
otherworldly feel to it. Her politics seems transcendent in
nature, its content, cultural and aesthetic and of a higher
order. Her politics is distinctive in its bias against the
masses, who as masses, are incapable of participating in the
kind of political life she envisions. But Arendt paints a
portrait of a politics that in some way resembles the
collective face of today's dissident pariah leaders. The
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leaders of the revolutionary people's movements of 1989
turned out to be mostly members of the intelligentsia:
students, professors, artists, poets, writers, and
generally, members of the cultural literati. These people
of letters and arts are very much in keeping with Arendt’s
concept of the conscious pariah. As caretakers,
instigators, and leaders, they have pursued the vigorous
conversation of politics, debated over structure, laws, and
constitutions. They have engaged in political action which,
for Arendt, as we have seen, is political speech or talk
about political things. These leaders have come out openly
as representatives of the pariah, who never before had a
legitimate status or a rightful place in affairs of state.
Arendt ' s concept of the pariah as actor, viewed against the
background of the emerging politics of Eastern and Central
Europe (led by the dissident as pariah), presents an
interesting broadening of her original idea. Viewed in this
way, the concept illustrates a further development and could
be creating an important precedent.
Botstein's comments suggest that the pariah's character
is not compromised by a move into the public realm, and in
fact to the contrary, is enhanced by it. And since Arendt
believes that freedom can only be experienced in politics,
it would seem implicit in her concern for the future
viability of the world, that the pariah must join the public
realm to help build, and experience authentic freedom.
Freedom only emerges where worldliness, a commitment to
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preserving the possibilities for action, has taken root.
This argument provides further support for the pariah's
relationship to action.
In Arendt
' s work, various elements of the pariah
identity manifest themselves differently within different
pariahs. While it is clear that she favors the conscious
pariah, who possesses a commitment to sustaining the
possibilities of political action through rebellion and
critique, both of her people and existing society, how does
Arendt treat the different kinds of pariahs? For example,
the conscious pariahs Bernard Lazare and Rosa Luxemburg
clearly, were very public and political figures, while Rahel
Varnhagen and poet Heinrich Heine were not. There seem to
be different shades of the pariah identity which includes
both a collective sense, in terms of the Jewish people being
a specifically pariah people, and a public sense, which
manifests itself in explicitly political acts such as
Luxemburg's socialism or Herzl's Zionism. In the sense in
which Arendt speaks of it, the pariah's collective identity
is comprised of cultural, artistic, moral, intellectual, and
critical elements. Given access to the public realm, the
pariah can channel these elements of collective identity
into a public and political identity. The pariah as pariah,
even though part of a collective identity, lacks political
status which she can only obtain through access to, and
cultivation of some type of public realm. If the pariah
fails to muster the resolve and the awareness to critically
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resist her situation, she possesses little more than a
private identity.
For Arendt, the pariah must become a conscious pariah
in order to achieve a public, hence, a political identity.
And herein lies the key: the public identity, shored up by a
sense of collective experience, is the most significant
identity for Arendt. Individuals' unique identities are
asserted in the public space where they become political.
Arendt 's sense of the political and of legitimate actors is,
as we have seen throughout this study, quite restricted and
at certain points appears inconsistent. The shift that
takes place in her thought from an agonal to a more
participatory view of politics, and the blending of both of
these approaches, constitutes what appears to be an
inconsistency. But despite these difficulties, Arendt
endows the conscious pariah with what she regards as
inherently political traits; those of speech, critique,
resistance, morality, justice, and impartiality. Arendt
searches for a public identity for the pariah that extends
beyond an understanding of Jewish identity as simply a
collective identity. Arendt' s thought on the pariah
considers this collective identity in terms of, and in
relation to a political identity. Her depiction of the way
in which Luxemburg's Polish peer-group was enriched by the
pariah's collective identity also illustrates how this
background encouraged and nurtured the formation of Rosa's
powerful political, i.e,, public identity. There is,
1 o 7
therefore, a relationship between the pariah's collective
identity and the emergence of an authentic political
identity. in Arendt 1 s portrait of Luxemburg, the pariah's
public identity manifests itself clearly. And therein,
Arendt s concern for the pariah's making a commitment to
preserving future possibilities for political action comes
to fruition.
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